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ABSTRACT
Koglin, Yunhua Ph.D., Purdue University, December, 2006. Security Mechanisms for
Content Distribution Networks. Major Professor: Elisa Bertino.
Securing data is becoming a crucial need for most internet-based applications. In
this research, we investigate security mechanisms for content distribution networks.
We address the problem of how to ensure that data, when moving among dierent
parties, are modied only according to the stated policies. We cast our solution in sup-
porting parallel and distributed secure updates to XML documents. The approach,
based on the use of a security region-object parallel ow (S-RPF) graph protocol, al-
lows dierent users to simultaneously update dierent portions of the same document,
according to the specied access control policies. It ensures data condentiality and
integrity. Additionally, it supports a decentralized management of update operations
in that a subject can exercise its privileges and verify the correctness of the operations
performed so far on the document without interacting, in most of the cases, with the
document server.
We then extend our document update application into Byzantine and failure prone
systems by removing the trusted party which is responsible for recovery of the docu-
ment. We have developed an approach which uses a group of delegates for recovering
documents. Many optimizations have been provided.
We improve previous solutions by proposing a scalable distributed protocol which
uses cryptographic techniques to provide dynamic group communications, participat-
ing anonymity and completeness, and privacy on access privileges.
Other security problems such as condentiality and availability are also investi-
gated in the application of content-based publish/subscribe (pub/sub) systems. We
propose a hierarchical event forwarding scheme which increases system availability byx
tolerating some broker failures. Our approach can eciently determine the subscrip-
tion groups to which an event must be delivered by exploiting locality. Moreover, we
propose an ecient encryption scheme, under which a broker encrypts an event only
once. The encryption key can be eciently derived by subscribers, even though they
may belong to dierent subscription groups.1
1 INTRODUCTION
Content distribution networks (CDNs) are all those applications which support data
dissemination, searching and retrieval. With the wide spread use of the internet,
CDNs have been studied extensively [1{21]. Most previous research focuses on en-
hancing the performance of CDNs by replication. Dierent mechanisms (such as
[22{26]) are used to deploy content replication on trusted cache proxies scattered
around the Internet. When receiving a client request, instead of asking a content
server for the requested contents, a proxy rst checks if these contents are locally
cached. Only when the requested contents are not cached or out of date are the
contents transferred from the content server to the clients. If there is a cache hit, net-
work bandwidth consumption can be reduced. A cache hit also reduces access latency
for clients. System performance therefore improves, especially when large amounts
of data are involved. Besides these improvements, caching makes the system robust
by letting caching proxies to provide content distribution services when the server is
down or the network is congested.
Secure content distribution has recently received more attention from both academia
and industry than before, due to the increasing emphasis on security in many appli-
cations. Ensuring content security in distributed environments is challenging. For ex-
ample, content may be easily modied or accessed when they are transmitted across
the internet; a compromised replica may violate access control of content, or dam-
age integrity by maliciously modifying the content. Moreover, with the emerging of
various network appliances and heterogeneous client environments, there are other
relevant new requirements for content services by intermediaries [6,7] which make
security enforcement dicult. For example, content from the server may need to be
transformed in order to adapt to the requirements of a client's security policy, de-
vice capabilities, preferences and so forth. Therefore, several content services have2
been identied that include, but are not limited to: content trans-coding [6{8,13], in
which data is transformed from one format into another, data ltering, and value-
added services, such as watermarking [10]. Other relevant services are related to
personalization, according to which special-purpose proxies can tailor the contents
based on user preferences,current activities, and past access history.
The use of the Internet for exchanging and managing data has pushed the need for
techniques and mechanisms that secure information when it ows across the net. Con-
dentiality and integrity are two main security properties that must be ensured to data
or information in all those distributed cooperative applications, such as collaborative
e-commerce [11], distance learning, telemedicine and e-government. Condentiality
means that data can only be accessed by subjects who are authorized by the stated
access control policies. Integrity means that data can only be modied by authorized
subjects.
Even though several access control mechanisms, specically tailored to the man-
agement of web documents [1,5,19,27{34], have been proposed, the problem of in-
tegrity has not been much investigated, even though it is a common requirement in
many application environments that not all parties be authorized to modify any data
that is exchanged. This is one major limitation of the previous research. Another
limitation is that most previous access control mechanisms heavily rely on a server
to mediate access to data. We are interested in reducing the server overhead, as
it is particularly important for performance; also, it is a basic requirement in some
contexts, such as real-time adaptive content delivery or mobile ad-hoc networks.
In this research, we address several issues to support decentralized and cooperative
data modication over the Web by casting our application in XML document updates.
A rst requirement, that is investigated in [35] is the development of a high level
language for the specication of ow policies, that is, policies regulating the set of
subjects that must receive a document during the update process. The second is
the development of an infrastructure and related algorithms to enforce condentiality3
and integrity during the process of distributed and collaborative document updates
[36,37].
Other issues such as availability are also important. We investigate availability
problem in the context of content-based publish/subscribe (pub/sub) systems. Previ-
ous research on content-based pub/sub systems mainly focuses on the ecient match-
ing performed by brokers. However, security issues have seldom been addressed, even
though they are the basic requirements for some applications. For example, when a
subscriber has registered by paying a fee for receiving events that satisfy its subscrip-
tion, a broker failure should not prevent the subscriber from receiving these events
on time. Moreover, other users who did not subscribe to these events should not have
access to them, thus condentiality is also need to be addressed.
1.1 Objectives of this work
The main objectives of this work are:
 to devise mechanisms to support data condentiality and integrity, especially
when data is moving around several parties according to the ow policy.
 to devise mechanisms to support data availability, cast in the application of
content-based publish/subscribe systems.
 to devise mechanisms to support fault tolerance in content distribution net-
works.
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. In the next chapter,
we present a protocol which support parallel and distributed secure updates to XML
documents. Chapter 3 extends our work by removing the trusted server which is
responsible for recovering during the update process. We then further extend the
work in Chapter 4 by proposing an protocol which uses cryptographic techniques to
provide dynamic group communications, participating anonymity and completeness,4
and privacy on access privileges. Finally, we present our result in content-based pub-
lish/subscribe systems in Chapter 5. We do not include a separate section on related
work, as such work is discussed in the chapters to which they are most appropriate.5
2 AN UPDATE PROTOCOL FOR XML DOCUMENTS IN DISTRIBUTED
AND COOPERATIVE SYSTEMS
In this chapter, we propose an approach supporting parallel and distributed secure
updates to XML documents. The approach, based on the use of a security region-
object parallel ow (S-RPF) graph protocol, is particularly suited for all environments
requiring cooperative updates to XML documents. It allows dierent users to simul-
taneously update dierent portions of the same document, according to the specied
access control policies. Additionally, it supports a decentralized management of up-
date operations in that a subject can exercise its privileges and verify the correctness
of the operations performed so far on the document without interacting, in most of
the cases, with the document server.
We cast our protocol in the framework of XML [38] 1 because of the widespread
adoption of such a standard in a large variety of application environments. Also,
XML organizes data according to hierarchical nested structures thus facilitating the
update parallelization. However, the techniques we present here can be easily adapted
to other hierarchical document formats.
2.1 Preliminaries
2.1.1 Flow and access control policies
Flow policies explicitly dene the order according to which subjects have to receive
the document, whereas access control policies specify each subject's privileges over
the document. These privileges include update and read. Update privileges allow a
subject to modify, insert or delete certain portion(s) of a document. Read privileges
1Therefore in the following we use the terms data and documents as synonyms.6
allow a subject to browse only certain portion(s) of the document. These portions
could be attribute(s), or element(s) of a document, as we will explain later.
In the following, we denote with the term Policy Base (PB) the set of ow and
access control policies apply to the set of documents managed by a document server
(DS). The ow path of the document among the subjects is denoted as Path =


subject0;subject1;:::;subjectN;subject(N+1)

, where subject0 = subject(N+1) is DS.
Thus we assume that the server is always the rst and the last subject in the path. A
subject can appear more than one time in Path and its privileges over the document
may not be the same every time.
To enforce authenticity/integrity, public-key algorithms, such as RSA, are used
for digitally signing the documents. We assume that DS knows the public keys of
the subjects involved in the update process and that all subjects know the public key
of DS. Thus the path a document must follow can also be specied in terms of the
public keys of the subjects that must receive the document. More precisely, Path =


pubk0;pubk1;:::;pubkN;pubk(N+1)

denotes the path that the document must follow,
where pubk0 = pubk(N+1) is the public key of DS, and pubki is the public key of the
ith subject in the document ow sequence.
2.1.2 Atomic elements and document regions
An XML document [38,39] is formed by tagged elements. A tagged element may
have one or more sub-elements, and one or more attributes. Elements can be nested.
Because of this feature, an XML document may be represented according to a graph
structure [36] as illustrated by Figure 2.1.
An atomic element (AE) is either an attribute or the starting and ending tags of
an element. An atomic region (AR) is a set of atomic elements to which the same
access control policies apply. We assume that each region be uniquely identied.
A region can be either modiable or non-modiable. A region is non-modiable
by a subject if this subject can only read it. A region is modiable by a subject if7
S
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Figure 2.1. (a) An example of XML document and (b) its correspond-
ing graph representation
this subject possesses the authorization to modify it, according to the access control
policies.
Based on the above denitions, we introduce the following notations:
Let D = fae1;ae2;:::;aemg be a document to be exchanged, consisting of a set of
atomic elements each of them individually identied by an identier. Document D is
partitioned into a set of regions fR1;R2;:::;RKg such that each region consists of a
region identier (i) assigned by DS and of a set of atomic elements. We denotes a re-
gion as Ri = (i;faeji
1;aeji
2;:::;aeji
rg where i 2 f1;:::;Kg and for any t 2 fji
1;:::;ji
rg,
1  t  m. Atomic elements within the same region are distinct and atomic elements
within disjoint regions are distinct.
Each document in our approach has an associated access control information struc-
ture (ACIS). Let D be a document, the corresponding ACIS is dened as far0; :::;
arN; ar(N+1)g such that:
 ari = (mod, non-mod)
Access regions are split into modiable and non-modiable regions.8
 mod  f1;:::;Kg, non-mod  f1;:::;Kg
The modiable region set and non-modiable region set are subsets of the entire
regions.
 mod \ non-mod = ;
If a region is modiable for a subject, it cannot be in the non-modiable set of
this subject and viceversa.
All regions are considered modiable by DS.
A region object O is an instance of the information in a region. A region object is
associated with the region identier, the subject who authors it, and the time when
the subject authors it. Time is not a concern with respect to integrity; so we denote
a region object O with a tuple (r;pubkey), where r 2 f1;:::;Kg and pubkey is the
public key of the subject who generates this region information. If a region Ri is
authored by two dierent subjects, with public key of pubkl and pubkm, there will be
two dierent region objects, one is (Ri;pubkl) and another one is (Ri;pubkm), even
though the information in region Ri may be the same. In XML, a region object can
be expressed as an element and the tag denotes the region identier.
All subjects participating in the update process use the same one-way hash func-
tion for integrity. When a subject subj updates a region Ri, it generates one-way hash
of the region object Oi it has authored. It then encrypts the hash with its private key,
thereby signing this region object. The signed hash will ow together with the region
object to which it corresponds. When a receiver s checks if Oi is authored by subj, s
generates a one-way hash of Oi and decrypts the signed hash with subj's public key
that s received from DS in the control information. If the signed hash matches the
hash value that s generated, the region object Oi is valid.
A package exchanged among subjects contains one or more region objects. Each
package starts with sid which denotes that this package is for the receiver who is
the ith subject in the Path. Following sid there are region objects. Each region
object includes an attribute of hash which is the encrypted hash from the subject
who authored this region object.9
2.2 General overview
The goal of the S-RPF protocol is to eciently support updates in distributed
and cooperative systems, and at the same time, to enforce ow and security policies.
Before starting the update process, DS determines a path P that the document
must follow. DS also generates an access control information structure for each subject
according to the security and ow policies for each subject (see Figure 2.2). From P
and ACIS, DS constructs a S-RPF graph and then derives the control information
(CI) for each subject from the graph. This control information species which regions
a subject will receive and how the subject can check the integrity of each region object
it receives. After DS sends out the control information for each subject, the update
process starts.
XML ACIS
S-RPF
Document
Path
CI
PB
Figure 2.2. Document pre-procssing
During the update process, each subject decrypts the package it receives; then it
uses the control information from DS to check the integrity of and to authenticate the
received package. After passing these checks, the subject may execute operation(s)
on region(s) of the document over which it possesses privileges. Once the update
operations are completed, the subject signs the region object(s) which it is authorized
to update with its private key, also in the case in which it does not alter the region
information. Finally, the subject enciphers the packages according to the control
information and sends them to the next receivers.10
2.3 S-RPF protocols
In this section, we illustrate the two protocols on which our approach relies, that
is, the server protocol, executed by DS, and the subject protocol, which is executed
by a subject upon receiving a document package. Before doing that, we state the
assumptions on which they rely.
2.3.1 Assumptions
We make the following assumptions for XML document updates:
 The subjects participating in the updates are cooperative. The completion of
the update depends on each subject. If one subject cheats more than twice,
a receiver will notify DS and DS may broadcast that the updates failed and
aborted. A recovery mechanism is detailed in Section 2.3.6.
 DS has access to the ow policies and to the security policies of the document.
The DS is a trusted entity. It determines these policies before the update
process starts. Then these policies are enforced and are not modied during the
execution of the update process.
 There is no collusion among the subjects. Each subject does not share infor-
mation with other subjects.
2.3.2 Server protocol
The server protocol includes the following steps: (1) construct the S-RPF graph,
(2) generate and send each subject its own control information, and (3) send to the
rst subject(s) the encrypted package(s). In the following, we illustrate all such steps.11
2.3.3 S-RPF construction
S-RPF is a directed graph G (see Figure 2.3(b)), where each node represents an
element in the ow path, and an arc between si and sj denotes that sj has to access
a document region after si has accessed it. The arc is labeled with the name of the
corresponding region and with the id of the last subject that modies it.
S1
{} {R1, R2}
{R4} {}
S4
DS
S3
S2
S1 <(R2,S1)>
<(R1,S3),(R3,S3)>
<(R1,DS)>
<(R4,S4)>
<(R2,S1)>
S2
(b)
{}
{R1,R2,R3,R4}
{}
mod
(a)
non-mod
{R1,R2,R3,R4}
{R2}
{R2}
{R1}
{R1, R3}
DS S4 S3
<(R1,DS),(R3,DS)>
DS
DS <(R4,DS)>
<(R2,S1)>
<(R1,DS),(R2,DS)>
Figure 2.3. (a) An example of Path and ACIS, (b) the corresponding S-RPF graph
DS builds the S-RPF according to the following rule:
S-RPF Rule: Each region object, which is accessed by a subject that
does not author it, ows only once out of the subject who authors it.
This rule enforces the correctness of the protocol (see Section 2.4.1). The algo-
rithm in Figure 2.4 is used to construct the S-RPF graph. It aims at maximizing the
parallelism of the process enabling the maximum number of subjects to work con-
currently. This feature reduces the total amount of time required to accomplish the
update process. The algorithm is organized according to the following main phases:
1. Initialization. A node in the graph represents an element in the ow path
(since a subject may appear more than once in the ow path, in the graph, subjecti
and subjectj may be the same subject). We also store in each node the necessary12
Algorithm Construct-RPF
Input: Path, ACIS
Output: G = (V;E)
1. for each i = 0 to N + 1 :
add node subjecti and
subjecti:pred = ;
subjecti:suc = ;
subjecti:reg = ;
2. for each i = 1 to K :
Reg[i]:s = Path:pubk0
for each i = 1 to N + 1
R = ACIS:ari
for each r 2 R
add (r; Reg[r]:s) to subjecti:reg
if r 2 R:mod
Reg[r]:s = subjecti:pubkey
3. AddEdges(Path, ACIS, G)
4. for each i = 1 to N
R = ACIS:ari
for each (r; s) 2 subjecti:reg
if s = Path:pubki
j =delete-pred(i, r)
delete-succ(j, i, r)
if r 2 R:non-mod
for each su 2 subjecti:succ
if r 2 su:reg
delete-succ(i, su.sid, r)
t = delete-pred(su.sid,r)
add-pred(j, r, su.sid)
add-succ(su.sid, r, j)
Figure 2.4. Algorithm for S-RPF construction
information that we will use for generating control information for each node. This
step initializes each node's predecessors (pred), successors (succ) and regions (reg)
which this subject is authorized to access. See Figure 2.6 for the denitions of pred
and succ.
2. Labeling regions. For each subject in the graph, this step labels each region that
this subject is authorized to access with the public key of the subject who authored
this region. We use array Regi to store the public key of the last subject that authored13
Procedure AddEdges
Input: Path, ACIS, G
Output: G
1. A = ACIS; AR = A:ar0
for each r 2 AR
for j = 1 to N + 1
if r 2 A:arj:mod
add-pred(0, r, j); add-succ(j, r, 0); break
if r 2 A:arj:no-mod
add-pred(0, r, j); add-succ(j, r, 0)
A:arj:non-mod= A:arj:non-mod nfrg
2. for each i = 1 to N
AR = A:ari
2.a for each r 2 AR:mod
for j = i + 1 to N + 1
if r 2 (A:arj:mod [ A:arj:non-mod)
& Path:pubkj 6= Path:pubki
add-pred(i, r, j); add-succ(j, r, i); break
if r 2 A:arj:mod & Path:pubkj = Path:pubki
break
if r 2 A:arj.non-mod & Path:pubkj = Path:pubki
A:arj:non-mod = A:arj:non-mod nfrg
2.b for each r 2 AR:non-mod
for j = i + 1 to N + 1
if r 2 A:arj:mod
add-pred(i, r, j); add-succ(j, r, i); break
if r 2 A:arj:non-mod
add-pred(i, r, j); add-succ(j, r, i)
A:arj:non-mod = A:arj:non-mod nfrg
Figure 2.5. Procedure AddEdges
region i and a structure ari that contains the accessible regions for the ith subject in
Path.
3. Adding edges. The procedure AddEdges, reported in Figure 2.5, updates G
by inserting edges for each subject in G, according to Path and ACIS.
4. Application of the S-RPF rule. If a region object O is to be received later by
the subject subj who authored it, we remove it from subj's incoming edges. If subj
only has read access to O later and needs to send O to another subject subs, then the
predecessor which is supposed to send O back to subj will send O to subs.14
Procedure AddEdges (Figure 2.5) works according to the following strategy: a
subject that has modied a region R sends it to the rst subsequent subject s in
Path that can access (read or modify) it. If s can only read this region, it forwards
the region to all subsequent subjects S in the path that can only read R until a subject
m is found that can modify R. Also m will receive from s the region. All subjects
in S will not send out R to anyone. Thus the subject that has generated a region
object cannot distribute dierent versions of the same region to dierent subsequent
subjects because they have to receive that region object from another subject.
The main phases in the procedure AddEdges are as followed:
1. Generating the outgoing regions for DS. This phase also adds incoming region
for subjects in Path. A region will be received by all the subjects that can only read
that region, following DS and preceding the rst subject in Path that can modify the
region. Also this last subject will receive this region from DS.
2. Generating the outgoing regions for all subjects. This phase also adds incoming
regions for subjects in Path and DS. We analyze, in order, for each subject in Path
the following:
2.a Modiable regions. A region will be received only by the rst subsequent
receiver that can access (read or modify) the region. As a subject may appear in
Path several times, this receiver must not be the current subject. A region object O
will not appear in the ow if the next receiver of O is the subject who authored it
and the next receiver has update privilege over it.
2.b Non-modiable regions. A region will be received by all the subjects that can
only read that region, following the current one and preceding the rst subject in
Path that can modify the region. Also this last subject will receive this region from
the current subject.
If there is no element p 2 subjectx:pred such that p:pid = i, function add-pred(i,
r, x) inserts in the set subjectx:pred an element p where: (1) p:pid = i, (2) p:sk = k
and k is a symmetric key generated by DS (3) p:reg = hti where t is the tuple in
subjecti:reg such that t:r = r. Otherwise it appends t in p:reg.15
If there is no element su 2 subjecti:succ such that su:sid = x, function add-
succ(x, r, i) inserts in the set subjecti:succ an element su where: (1) su:sid = x, (2)
su:sk = k and k = subjectx:pred:p:sk, (3) su:reg = hri. Otherwise it appends r in
su:reg.
delete-pred(i, r) function deletes r from p:reg such that p 2 subjecti:pred and
r 2 p:reg, and returns an index p:pid. subjecti will not expect to receive a region r
from its predecessor subjectp:pid. If p:reg = ; , then delete p from subjecti:pred.
delete-succ(j, i, r) function deletes r from su:reg such that (1) su 2 subjectj:succ,
(2) su:sid = i, (3) r 2 su:reg. subjectj will not send region r to its successor subjecti.
If su:reg = ;, then delete su from subjectj:succ.
So it is possible that dierent subsets of all non-modiable regions are sent to
dierent subjects, and the same region object can be sent to dierent receivers by
the same subject. According to the algorithm for the construction of S-RPF, a given
region of the document cannot be updated by more than one subject at a time.
From above, the S-RPF graph that DS generated has the following properties:
 If no subject has access rights to a region R, then no region object O such that
O:r = R will appear in the ow of the S-RPF graph.
 If a region object is modied by a subject subj, then this region object will not
ow out from subj and a new region object will start at subj.
 A region object may have several copies owing in the graph at the same time.
 No region object ows back to the subject who authored it.
 If no subject has update rights on a region R, but at least one subject has access
to this region, then a region object O, such that O:r = R, will start its ow at
DS and its author will be DS.
From above, we can easily derive the following property:
Property 1: The ow of each region object among the subjects in the
update process is acyclic.16
Based on this feature, the S-RPF protocol could allow any static update policy.
For example, during the update process a region can be modied more than once by a
subject, or a region could be updated by a subject, and later on, read by the subject.
Even though the original path may contain cycles among all subjects, based on the
algorithm we presented in this chapter, each region object ows among all subjects
in an acylic way.
2.3.4 Control information
The Control Information (CI) contains, for each subject in the path, the corre-
sponding incoming package templates and outgoing package templates. Figure 2.6
details the structure of CI.
An incoming package template contains the symmetric key for the receiver to
decrypt an incoming package; it also includes the sequence of regions the incoming
package will contain, and for each region the public key of the last subject who
authored this region. The goal of an incoming package template is to help a receiver
to verify that the package it receives is from a specied sender and to verify that
the content of the package is correct up to that point. Dierent subjects will receive
dierent incoming templates from DS. An outgoing package template includes the
symmetric key for the sender to encrypt the package and the sequence of regions to
be sent in this package, so the sender can organize a package for its successor with
the correct content.
After building the S-RPF graph G, it is easy for DS to generate control information
for each subject. DS just copies G:subjecti:pred and G:subjecti:succ to CIi:pred and
CIi:succ, then sends to each subject its control information.
Example 1 Suppose that S5 receives R1, R2, R3, R4 from S1, S2, S3, and S4, respectively
and that R1, R2, R3, R4 are updated by S1, S2, S3, and S4, respectively (Figure 2.7).
The instructions from DS to S5 are: to read R1 and send it to DS (no one will access R1
anymore), to form a new package which consists of three regions, R2; R3 and R4 and to send17
CI = fCI0;CI1;:::;CIN;CI(N+1)g and
CIi =(i;pred;succ) is the control information generated for ith subject in Path
pred = fpP1;:::;pPig: set of incoming package templates
px = (pid; skxi; reg): an incoming template from xth subject in Path, where
1. pid = x and x 2 fP1;:::;Pig
reg = hrs1;:::;rsH(x)i
rsj = (r; s); j 2 f1;:::; H(x)g
r 2 f1;:::;Kg, s is the public key of the last P-proxy that modied r
pid is the sender's position generated according to Path
skxi is the symmetric key for encrypting/decrypting the package
sending from subjx to subji, where subjt is the tth subject in Path
2. 8j;w 2 f1;:::;H(x)g: j 6= w ) rsj:r 6= rsw:r
a region must appear only once in the sequence of regions from a predecessor.
3. 8j;q 2 f1;:::;P(i)g: j 6= q ) skji 6= skqi
component pred contains distinct predecessor subjects
4. 8j;q 2 f1;:::;P(i)g, j 6= q, x 2 f1;:::;H(j)g, y 2 f1;:::;H(q)g : pj:rsx:r 6= pq:rsy:r
an accessible region must be received only from one predecessor.
succ = fsuS1;:::;suSig: set of outgoing package templates
suy = (sid; skiy; reg) this is an outgoing template, where
1. sid = y and y 2 fS1;:::;Sig
sid is the position of the receiver of this package according to Path.
skiy is the symmetric key as dened before
reg = hr1;:::;rW(y)i: sequence of regions sent to successor who is at the yth position in Path.
rf 2 f1;:::;Kg, f 2 f1;:::;W(y)g, 8j;g 2 f1;:::;W(y)g: j 6= g ) rj 6= rg
A region must appear only once in the sequence of region objects to be sent to a successor.
2. 8j;x 2 fS1;:::;Sig: j 6= x ) suj:skij 6= sux:skix
successors are distinct.
Figure 2.6. Control information specication
it to S6. If Path =hpubk0;pubk1;pubk2;pubk3;pubk4;pubk5;pubk6;pubk7i, where pubk0 and
pubk7 is the public key of DS and pubki is the public key of Si, then the control information
for S5 will be expressed as following:
CI5 = (5; pred; succ) where
 pred = f(1;sk15;< (1;pubk1) >), (2;sk25;< (2;pubk2) >), (3;sk35;< (3;pubk3) >),
(4;sk45;< (4;pubk4 >)g
 succ = f(7;sk57;< 1 >), (6;sk56;< 2;3;4 >)g.
Control information is signed by DS and enciphered with the recipient's public key
so that only the designated subject can see the information. The designated subject
can verify that the message is from DS. Control information exchange could also be
performed by opening an SSL session in which a symmetric session key is generated18
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Figure 2.7. Generating control information for S5
and used during the communication. Thus a secure channel is built between a subject
and DS.
2.3.5 Subject protocol
During document updates, each subject executes the following steps: (i) it per-
forms integrity check according to incoming package templates received from DS; (ii)
it executes operations on the document according to its privileges; (iii) it forms pack-
ages according to outgoing package templates received from DS, and sends out these
packages. We detail these steps in the following:
1. Upon receiving a package P, the receiver by using the control information CIi,
veries (1) if there has been any transmission error; if there is any error, asks
the sender to send the document again; (2) that the package has been sent by
one of its predecessors. Suppose the receiver deciphers P with the symmetric
key k such that k = px:sk and px 2 CIi:pred. If P:sid 6= CIi:id, the package
is discarded. (3) the integrity and authorization of each region according to
the incoming package template. For each R in px:reg, the receiver checks if the
region object in the package starts with a region identier equal to R:r. If so,
the receiver generates a hash value using one-way hash function, deciphers the
hash in the package with R:s and checks if these two values are equal. If there
is any error, it asks the sender to recover19
2. The receiver performs operations on the document according to its privileges.
After correctly receiving a package from each predecessor, the receiver executes
its privileges on the documents. If it has update privileges on some regions, it
updates the regions, calculates the hash value for each region it updated, and
ciphers this value with its private key for future authorization checking.
3. The receiver generates the new package(s). For each su 2 CIi:succ, the receiver
forms an outgoing package U such that U:sid = su:sid. For each r 2 su:reg,
lls hash and region object in U. After this, the subject encrypts U with su:sk
and sends it to the sidth subject. The receiver should also keep a copy for later
recovery.
2.3.6 Recovery protocol
If a subject receives a package which fails the verication, the subject asks the
sender to recover the package. If a receiver cannot get an error-free package according
to the control information twice, it will send both packages it believes are incorrect
to DS and the sender.
DS then rst checks if the malicious sender m of the erroneous region has only
read access to this region. If not, DS decides to abort the update, because we assume
that the completion of update depends on each subject correctly updating their cor-
responding regions. If m only has read access, DS asks all the receivers who received
this region from m. If any one has a correct version, DS sends this correct version
to all the senders who did not receive a corrected version from m. If no one has a
correct version, DS asks the subject who authored this region to send DS a copy, DS
then acts in the role of m, checking the integrity and sending to all the receivers to
whom m was supposed to send this region.20
2.4 Analysis and discussions
2.4.1 Correctness analysis
From Section 2.3.3, we can conclude that the S-RPF built by DS enforces ow
policies related to an XML document. If subject Sa updates region R before subject
Sb in the ow policy, the ow of R in the S-RPF built by DS will also have this order.
Moreover if a subject Sc reads region R after Sa has modied it, then this order is
preserved in S-RPF.
Theorem 2.4.1 Protocol S-RPF is secure with respect to integrity.
Proof We need to prove that a subject m cannot update a region over which it does
not have update privilege. There are two cases.
(1) m modies a region object which is not authored by itself. In this case,
integrity is enforced in the protocol by digital signature. If a region R is modied
by a subject i, i will sign the hash that it calculated from R with its private key.
If a subject j has read privileges on R, j will receive control information from DS,
which contains an incoming template. The incoming template includes the public key
of i for deciphering the hash. j will calculate the hash of the region and check the
signature. m cannot modify region R before it reaches j, since m does not know i's
private key.
If m receives two region objects authored by the same subject i, it cannot switch
the information in these two regions. As a region object represented in XML has a
region identier in its tag.
Thus no subject can modify a region object which has not been authored by itself.
(2) A subject modies a region object authored by itself, even though it does not
has update privilege over it later. This is avoided by the S-RPF rule. Suppose region
R1 is updated by A, then ows to B for read, and then back to A for read (A cannot
update R1 this time) and then ends at C for read. In this case, A could not send to C
a region object which is dierent from the one it sends to B. In S-RPF graph, B will21
send a copy to C instead of A. S-RPF ensures that C receive the region object that
A authored at the beginning. Thus the integrity of the whole document is enforced.

Theorem 2.4.2 Protocol S-RPF is secure with respect to condentiality.
Proof We need to prove that if a subject not authorized to access a region, it can
not read it. This is enforced by the use of symmetric keys to encipher/decipher a
package that only designated receiver can see it. When a subject receives a package, it
can use the received control information from DS to decipher the package. If a subject
does not have such information, it cannot decipher the package. S-RPF generation
ensures that a subject only receives the parts of the document which it is authorized
to access. Thus S-RPF is secure with respect to condentiality. 
We now discuss the amount of information which could be revealed and check
if condentiality and integrity are violated. With this approach, a receiver could
partially know the access rights of its predecessor(s) or successor(s). In Example 1,
S6 knows that S5 has access rights to at least R2; R3 and R4. S5 knows that S6 has
access rights to at least R2; R3 and R4. Other than that, no other information can
be derived. This will not violate condentiality and integrity as dened previously,
because these denitions concentrate on the contents of a document.
2.4.2 Complexity analysis
We now analyze the complexity with respect to temporal complexity and com-
munication complexity. The latter is evaluated in terms of number of exchanged
messages. We also compare our approach against a centralized approach.
In particular, under a centralized approach, DS sends each subject in Path a
package containing only the contents of a document to which the subject has access
privileges. After executing operations on it, the subject sends back to DS only the
parts that it has updated. When DS correctly receives it, that is, there are no22
transmission errors, DS sends another package to the next subject in Path. Otherwise,
DS sends the subject the package again and asks for recovery. A centralized system
accomplishes the same function as our protocol. It also uses symmetric key to allow
DS securely communicate with each subject. However, in a centralized approach,
no hash function is needed and subjects do not need to sign the region objects they
authored, since DS communicates with each subject securely and knows each subject's
access control information structure.
There are two types of errors that require a recovery. They are as following:
1. Subject-will-recover error: This includes transmission errors, and any other er-
rors occuring in a centralized approach that require DS to ask a subject recovery.
2. Malicious-subject-intentional error: A malicious subject illegally modies a re-
gion object and refuses to send the correct version to a receiver.
Only the rst type of errors can happen in the centralized approach. In S-RPF,
DS is needed for the second type error recovery.
In the following analysis, all communications before the start of the updates are
ignored. As in a centralized system, DS also needs to communicate with all subjects
to set up secure communication channels before starting the update process. In order
to simplify our analysis, we will not consider the size of hash value in a package.
Next, we present the results for communication cost. We compare two cases: no
recovery and recovery.
1. No recovery:
In this case, the total number of packages PK and total size of messages M are
as following:
 for the centralized approach
{ PK = 2N
{ M =
Pi=N
i=1 Ai +
Pi=N
i=1 Ui
 for S-RPF protocol23
{ PK =
Pi=N
i=1 Prsi + PrDS
{ M =
Pi=N
i=1 Ai + u
Where:
N is the number of elements in the path, not including DS;
Ai is the size of the package that DS sends to subjecti in centralized approach;
Ui is the size of the package subjecti sends back to DS. This package only
contains updated regions by subjecti.
Pri is the number of predecessors of subjecti in S-RPF graph.
u is the sum of the size of packages DS received in S-RPF graph. (u 
Pi=N
i=1 Ui)
2. Recovery:
If the recovery has to be executed because of the rst type of error, the extra
packages caused by the recovery in the centralized system is equal to that in S-
RPF. As in S-RPF, a receiver will act the same as DS in the centralized system,
asking the sender to recover.
If the recovery has to be executed because of the second type of error, S-RPF
will incur extra cost which will not appear in the centralized approach. In this
case, DS in S-RPF may need to ask up to N   2 subjects for a correct version.
From above, we can see that when all subjects are cooperative and a region is
updated often (for example, Case B in Figure 2.8), S-RPF reduces the number of
packages (in case B, only N + 1 packages) and the total size of messages (in case B,
Pi=N
i=1 Ai + UN). However, S-RPF could also possible generate O(N2) packages. The
total number of packages in S-RPF is equal to the number of edges in S-RPF graph.
In congested networks and uncooperative systems, S-RPF may not perform better
than the centralized approach.
Next, we analyze the eciency of the protocol by comparing the time needed to
complete the update. The parameters we used in analysis are listed in Table 2.1. The
total time needed to complete the update is formulated as T 
Pi=7
i=1 Ti.24
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Figure 2.8. Case study for the total time to complete the update
Table 2.1
Notations for eciency analysis
DS
T1 Total time for deciphering and enciphering packages
T2 Total time for calculating hash values and encrypting them
T3 Total time for integrity check of received packages
Subjects
T4 Total time for deciphering and enciphering packages
T5 Total time for integrity checking
T6 Total time for executing operations (read, update)
T7 Total time for calculating hash values and encrypting them
N Number of subjects in the path, not including DS
E Average time for enciphering a package
D Average time for deciphering a package
H Average time for checking integrity of regions in a re-
ceived package
U Average time for a subject in Path executing opera-
tions(read/update)
h Average time for a subject or DS in Path calculating
the hash values for the region objects that it authored
and encrypting them
1. No recovery. We can easily estimate the time for the centralized system. For
the S-RPF, the time varies. We study the cases in Figure 2.8 which represent a
high-level parallel updates (Case A and Case C) and low-level parallel updates
(Case B). Table 2.2 reports the time complexity.
From Table 2.2, we can see that when N > 1 the S-RPF for Case B takes more
time than Case C:
TB   TC = (N   1)(h + U)25
Table 2.2
Time analysis in the case of no recovery
Centralized S-RPF (Fig 2.8)
approach Case A Case B Case C Case D
T1 N  (D + E)
N(D+E)
2 D + E N  (D + E) N  (D + E)
T2 0 h h h h
T3 0 NH
2 H N  H N  H
T4 N  (D + E) 2(D + E) N  (D + E) D + E
N(1+N)(D+E)
2
T5 0 2H N  H H
N(N+1)H
2
T6 N  U 2U N  U U N  U
T7 0 2h N  h h N  h
Also, Case B takes more time than Case A:
TB   TA =
(N   2)(D + E + H + 2h + 2U)
2
The best time for S-RPF to complete the update is hard to nd. For example,
TC  TA =
(N 2)(D+E+H)
2  (h+U). If the average time for an object executing
operation takes longer time than the time of
N(D+E+H)
2 , then Case C is better
than Case A. If N is large and the average time for a subject nishing operations
is fast, then Case A can be better than Case C.
The worst case for S-RPF is when DS sends a package to each subject and each
subject sends a package to everyone following it (Case D). However, the time to
complete the update is far less than
Pi=7
i=1 Ti in Table 2.2. As S1 is deciphering
the package and executing integrity checking, all other subjects following it will
also check integrity of the packages they received from DS. So the worst time
of the S-PRF is
T 
E  N2 + 3N  E
2
+ (N + 1)(D + h + H) + N  U
The time dierence between the centralized approach with the S-RPF Case B
is N(D+E  h H) (D+E +H +h). Since D  E and h  H in Case B, it
can be simplied as N(2D 2H) 2D 2H. This means that, if deciphering a26
package takes similar time as integrity checking a package, then the centralized
approach has similar time as S-RPF case B.
Next we compare a centralized approach with S-RPF Case A, where subjects
can execute parallel operations on the document. Since normally D  E and
h  H:
3N  D + N  U 
N  H
2
+ 4D + 3h + 2U + 2H
=) U 
H
2
  3D +
6H   2D
N   2
Under the situation that D  2H
N 2, when the average time for a subject execut-
ing operation is longer than half time of integrity checking, then S-RPF in this
case requires less time to complete update than the centralized approach.
2. Recovery: If a recovery has to be executed because of the rst type of error, for
the centralized system, the extra time is 2D + 2E; for n recoveries, the extra
time increases linearly, that is, n(2E +2D). For the S-RPF protocol, the extra
time varies. It depends on the S-RPF graph computed by DS and the location
of the recovery. It may even not increase the total time due to the parallel
operations among all participants.
If the recovery has to be executed because of the second type of error, no
extra time is required for the centralized approach. For S-RPF, the additional
incurred time varies. If the number of subjects involved in the recovery is very
small, then the overall completion time may not increase. If many subjects are
involved in the recovery, the extra time may increase substantially.
Since encipher and decipher operations can be very fast, while human interactions
are in most cases involved in the update, S-RPF can complete the update faster than
centralized approach if subjects are cooperative. When more subjects are involved,
even if U  H, S-RPF could be still more ecient than centralized systems.27
2.5 Conclusion and future work
In this chapter, we have proposed a protocol for distributed document update
in cooperative systems.The protocol enforces both ow and security policies of a
document and simultaneous updates on dierent parts of a document can be executed.
In a cooperative system, when several subjects update a large document, S-RPF can
reduce the time to complete the update, especially when human beings are involved
in update process. If the recovery is not due to malicious subjects, the frequency of
recovery to be executed by DS is low. However, if a malicious subject is detected, the
recovery can be expensive.
Flow policies and access control policies can be static or dynamic. Subjects in-
volved in static ow policies will not change and their order of receiving a document
is pre-xed. In static access control policies, each subject's privilege over a document
will not change during the update process. By contrast, in dynamic ow policies, a
subject may join in or drop out of during the update. The privilege of a subject over
a document may also change. This protocol applies to static ow and access control
policies. It can also be extended to certain dynamic security policies; however, due
to space limits, we do not detail such extensions here. Future work includes to test
our protocol's performance in real systems.28
3 XML DOCUMENT UPDATES IN BYZANTINE AND FAILURE-PRONE
DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS
In this chapter, we present an approach for the cooperative updates of XML docu-
ments particularly suited for Byzantine and failure-prone distributed systems. With
the term Byzantine, we mean a party involved in the process that does not obey the
dened protocols. The proposed approach is based on a specic infrastructure that
extends the one already presented in [36]. Here we introduce the possibility of spec-
ifying the path that a document must follow and of modifying it during the update
process. We support such feature through ow paths and related policies for its speci-
cation and modication. The most important feature of the proposed system is that
recovery is fully distributed as the last correct version of a corrupted document is co-
operatively built by a set of subjects, called delegates, instead of by one trusted party.
In the previous approach ( [36]), the DO is responsible for the recovery. However,
there are many situations under which the DO cannot do this. For example, under
the principle of separation of duty, the DO is not allowed to access the document
until it nished. Furthermore, we allow some Byzantine and failure prone delegates
exist. The approach we proposed in this chapter achieves the security requirements
as previous chapter, while at the same time, meets all these constraints.
3.1 Motivating example
In this section, we provide an example that motivates the need for our infrastruc-
ture, cast in the domain of pharmaceutical surveys. In such surveys, doctors from
dierent hospitals are asked to give feedback on several drugs used for common dis-
eases. These drugs are manufactured by dierent companies. As the survey results29
will be made public later, these companies would like to see that the feedback favors
their medicines.
Participating hospitals are chosen based on an agreement with these companies.
The survey document should be circulated among each of the participating hospitals.
The order of circulation is xed before the survey starts. Doctors of a participating
hospital will answer the questions asked in the survey document when they receive it.
Doctors may also extend the circulation path by adding their nurses, who may update
certain sub-sections of the survey for their doctors. Nurses however are not permitted
to alter other sub-sections. Only doctors are allowed to extend the circulation path;
nurses should not do so.
In order to ensure that the survey is processed correctly, parties such as public
notaries are required. These parties are chosen based on the agreement with the
companies. If the survey document is corrupted by a malicious participant (for ex-
ample, in order to favor a certain company, a doctor/nurse may overwrite information
on the survey without authorization), the notaries are responsible for recovering the
uncorrupted document. We would like to choose the fewest number of notaries pos-
sible. However, it is extremely dicult to make all companies to believe that one
trusted notary exists which will execute the recovery correctly. In fact, it is possible
for a notary to damage the integrity of the survey quite easily. For example, if a
doctor extends the document circulation path by letting his nurse ll in parts of it,
and if the nurse lls information which does not favor a particular company which
patronizes the notary, the notary could delete the information lled by the nurse, as
if the doctor did not extend the survey path. Therefore, it is dicult to have a single
trusted notary. However, among a number of notaries, we could be condent that a
certain number of them would be honest. For example, assume that 80% of the time,
any given notary behaves honestly. With 10 notaries public, we expect 8 of them
will behave honestly, even though at the beginning of the survey, we are not sure
which ones are honest. Also, in reality, some notaries may not always be available
for monitoring the process due to circumstances beyond their control. Waiting until30
every notary becomes available may delay the time for completing the survey, which
in turn may delay the involved companies from executing business operations which
depends on the result of such surveys (e.g., advertising campaigns).
Another concern is to ensure that the survey is unbiased. Doctors or nurses may
be inuenced by the answers lled in by people from dierent hospitals. Thus infor-
mation provided by doctors or nurses of dierent hospitals should be kept condential.
Additionally, a doctor or nurse may ll in some information that violates the secu-
rity and privacy policies of their hospital. Therefore, after they nish answering the
survey, the administrative sta of the hospital should check if there are any such
violations. If so, they should be able to remove them. However, administrative sta
should should not access information provided by other hospitals.
3.2 Related work
An overview of research work and commercial products related to XML security
can be found in [40]. Most of the proposals deal with condentiality issues and do not
consider the problem of controlled document updates. Even though we are not aware
of other proposals to which our system can be directly compared, related work in-
cludes: proposals concerning the update of XML documents [41{43]; group communi-
cation techniques and the fault tolerance problem in distributed systems [44{46]; and
proposals to manage the illegal behaviour of Byzantine subjects ( [47{51]). In general,
approaches dealing with updates of XML documents do not deal with security [41,43]
or rely on centralized approaches [42]. Therefore they are not suitable for highly de-
centralized approaches, as the one considered in this chapter. The distributed nature
of the collaborative update of XML documents presented in this chapter implies, as
a requirement, the use of group communication techniques. A survey of the main
group communication specications is given in [44]. Our protocols take into account
the fault tolerance problem inherent in the asynchronous and failure-prone nature of
distributed systems. Our design has been heavily inuenced by protocols proposed31
in [45,46]. The main dierence between the previous approaches [44{46] and ours is
these approaches are based on the notion of Views of a communicating group. That
is, messages must be exchanged only between members of the current view. Thus a
stop of the communication is generated whenever the view changes according to the
insertion of a new member or the exit of a current one. We adopt a group management
specication which requires considering at each instant the initial entire communicat-
ing group chosen by the DO, that is, DG. Another feature of our protocols is that it
provides methods to mitigate malicious behaviors of a limited number of Byzantines.
The Byzantine problem has been extensively investigated ( [47{51]). Most approaches
are based on the specication of conditions according to which it is possible to de-
tect malicious behaviors of Byzantines and to continue without aecting the global
computation. We borrow from the above mentioned proposals the idea of adding a
number of redundant subjects in a communicating group in order to prevent the sup-
posed number of Byzantine subjects in the group from aecting the communication
protocol with their behavior. Moreover, we borrow the idea that when dealing with
a set of entities containing some Byzantine ones, each entity must receive a number
of messages determined according to the estimated number of Byzantines, to allow
the protocols to correctly progress.
3.3 Specication languages
Before we present the specication languages that we have developed to support
the collaborative and distributed XML document updating, we rst describe the
example survey document that will be used.
Example 2 The survey document (Figure 3.1) is named "Medicine Eect". For
simplicity, the survey concerns medicines M1 to M10 which are manufactured by
drug companies "C1" to "C10" respectively. The subjects who update this document
are doctors from hospitals "H1" to "H50". The doctors should give the positive and
negative eects for each medicine, the number of times they prescribed it, and the32
overall ecacy rating of the medicine. Doctors may also extend the document ow
path by permitting their nurses to update the document.
  <Medicine name = "M2" company = "C2">
<\Survey>
  ....
  <\Medicine>
           ....
  <\Medicine>
       ...
       <\Doctor>
           ....
       <Doctor name = "Don" hospital = "H2">
       <\Doctor>
          <Overall rate = ".." recommend=".."/>
          <Num_of_use> N/A  <\Num_of_use>
          <Negative> fill in <\Negative>
          <Positive> fill in <\Positive>
       <Doctor name = "Tony" hospital = "H1">
  <Medicine name = "M1" company = "C1">
Survey name = "Survey.xml" note="Medicine Effect">
Figure 3.1. An example of XML document
Access control policies are encoded using the X-sec language [52]. The term Policy
Base (PB) denotes the XML le encoding access control policies that apply to the
DO's XML documents.1 The Policy Base is specied according to the X-Sec Policy
Base template shown in Figure 3.2(a). Note currently, our Policy Base template does
not support add element and add attribute privileges. We plan to include them in
future work.
Example 3 Figure 3.2(b) shows a PB referring to the XML document in Figure
3.1. According to the policies in Figure 3.2(b) administrative employees can browse
all information lled by doctors or nurses of their hospital. They can also delete
information contained in Num of use elements for security reason. A doctor or nurse
can only update information.
1We assume that each policy is uniquely identied by an identier, generated by the system when
the policy is specied.33
<!DOCTYPE policy base[
<!ELEMENT policy base
(policy spec*)>
<!ELEMENT policy spec
EMPTY>
<!ATTLIST policy spec
pid ID
cred expr CDATA
#REQUIRED
target CDATA
#REQUIRED
path CDATA #IMPLIED
priv (update attr
j delete attr
j delete elemt
j view
j navigate
j browse all)
#REQUIRED
prop (CASCADE
j FIRST LEVEL
j NO PROP)
#REQUIRED>
]>
(a)
<policy base>
<policy spec pid=`P1'
cred expr=`//Type[@Role=`Admin' AND
host=`H1']'
target=`Survey.xml' path=`//Doctor[@host='H1']'
priv=`browse all' prop=`CASCADE'= >
<policy spec pid=`P2'
cred expr=`//Type[@Role=`Doctor' AND
host=`H1']' target=`Survey.xml'
path=`//Doctor[@host='H1']'
priv=`update' prop=`NO PROP'= >
<policy spec pid=`P3'
cred expr=`//Type[@Role=`Doctor' AND
host=`H2']' target=`Survey.xml'
path=`//Doctor[@host=`H2']'
priv=`update' prop=`CASCADE'= >
<policy spec pid=`P4'
cred expr=`//Type[@Role=`Nurse' AND
host=`H1']' target=`Survey.xml'
path=`//Doctor[@host='H1']' priv=`update'
prop=`CASCADE'= >
<policy spec pid=`P5'
cred expr=`//Type[@Role=`Admin' AND
host=`H1']' target=`Survey.xml'
path=`//Doctor[@host='H1']/Num of use'
priv=`delete elemt' prop=`CASCADE'= >
...
</policy base>
(b)
Figure 3.2. (a) The X-Sec Policy Base template and (b) an example of Policy Base
Subjects, to which an access control policy applies, are specied by means of
credentials, encoded in XML using X-Sec [52]. Examples of X-Sec credentials are
presented in Figure 3.3.
<H_staff>                                                <H_staff>
  <Eid> 112 </Eid>                                    <Eid> 235 </Eid>
  <Type Role="Admin" host ="H1"\>      <Type Role="Nurse" host = "H2"\>
<\H_staff>                                               <\H_staff>   
<H_staff>                                              <H_staff>
  <Eid> 110 </Eid>                                    <Eid> 253 </Eid>
  <Type Role="Doctor" host ="H1"\>      <Type Role="Doctor" host = "H2"\>
<\H_staff>                                               <\H_staff>
  <Name> Ann  </Name>                          <Name> Cathy </Name>
  <Name> Brian  </Name>                        <Name> Don </Name>
Figure 3.3. Examples of X-Sec credentials
A ow policy denotes the sequence of subjects that must receive the document.
This sequence can be fully specied at the beginning of the update process, or partially34
        <ExtSpec Id="8">nosubpath</ExtSpec>
     </ReceiverProfile>
  </ReceiverSpec>
  </ReceiverSpec>
  <ReceiverSpec Id = "9">
     <ReceiverProfile Id="10">
        <CredSpec Id = "11">
          //Type[@Role="Doctor" AND @host="H2"]
        </CredSpec>
        <ExtSpec Id="12">subpath</ExtSpec>
     </ReceiverProfile>
  </ReceiverSpec>
  ...
<\Fpa>
        </CredSpec>
<Fpa ...> 
  <ReceiverSpec Id = "1">
     <ReceiverProfile Id="2">
        <CredSpec Id = "3">
          //Type[@Role="Doctor" AND @host="H1"]
        </CredSpec>
        <ExtSpec Id="4">subpath</ExtSpec>
     </ReceiverProfile>
  </ReceiverSpec>
  <ReceiverSpec Id = "5">
     <ReceiverProfile Id="6">
        <CredSpec Id = "7">
          //Type[@Role="Admin" AND @host="H1"]
Figure 3.4. A possible ow policy
specied when the process starts and then modied and extended by authorized
subjects. A ow policy contains some receiver specications, that is, properties that
have to be veried by the receivers. Each receiver specication contains one or more
alternative receiver proles. A receiver satises a receiver specication if it satises
at least one of the receiver proles contained in that specication. Receiver proles
consist of a credential expression, that is, a condition specied against credentials by
means of XPath [53]. Our ow policy specication language enables also an originator
to grant a receiver the permission of extending a ow policy by inserting a sub ow
policy.
Example 4 Figure 3.4 shows a ow policy associated with the document in Figure
3.1. It species that the rst receiver must be a doctor in hospital "H1" and the second
receiver must be the administrative employee of "H1". Only doctors can extend the
ow policy by inserting a new sub ow policy. Thus a doctor may let his/her nurses
update the information.35
Modications to ow policies are governed by ow modication rules, which state
which subjects can modify a ow policy. Like credentials and access control policies,
ow modication rules are encoded using X-Sec. We denote with the term Rule
Base (RB) an XML le encoding a set of ow modication rules. This specication
language is very similar to that used to specify access control policies, thus we omit
the formal presentation of such a language.
3.4 Control information
In this section, we introduce the control information needed by subjects to check
document content integrity, and to correctly exercise their modication rights on
the document content. Before presenting document control information, we have to
introduce some preliminary concepts.
3.4.1 Preliminary denitions
Our approach to ensure condentiality is based on encryption techniques. All the
document portions to which the same policies apply are encrypted with the same
encryption key. Each subject that has an authorization over some portions of a docu-
ment receives all and only the keys needed to decrypt those portions. Further details
about this encryption method are available in [54]. In particular, the encryption of a
document consists of two main phases: the rst, referred to as marking phase, marks
all document portions with a label containing a list of access control policy identiers,
whereas the second, referred to as encryption phase, encrypts all document portions
according to the strategy explained above.
This leads to the denition of document atomic element, which is the basic portion
of an XML document that is individually encrypted.
Denition 3.4.1 (Document Atomic Element). Let d be an XML document.
The set DocAE(d) of document atomic elements of d is dened as follows: 1) for36
each element e in d, and for each attribute2 a in e: e:a 2 DocAE(d);3 2) for each
element e in d, e:tags 2 DocAE(d).
Note that the reason why we can encrypt the start and end tag of an element
with a dierent key wrt the one used for its content and attributes is that we support
attribute-level access control policies. Therefore, elements belonging to an XML doc-
ument d give rise to two or three non-contiguous atomic components in the encrypted
document, depending on their type. By contrast, an attribute always corresponds to
a single atomic element (that is, the attribute name and its value, or only the value
for data content). For this reason, each encrypted document atomic element docae
has associated a position information that species where docae's components are
located into d.
Example 5 Examples of atomic elements in the XML document in Figure 3.1 are:
a) `name = `D1": the rst attribute of the Doctor element;
b) `N/A': the data content of the Num of use element;
c) `<Overall', `= >': the two components of the empty-element Overall;
d) `<Doctor', `>', `</Doctor>': the three components of the start and end tag of
Doctor element.
The set of atomic elements encrypted with the same key is called a document
region. We assume that each document region is uniquely identied by an identier.
The DO of an XML document and/or of a ow policy generates a set of signed
certicates, containing information concerning the privileges a subject can exercise
over the document and/or ow policy, according to its PB and RB. Certicates
generated for XML documents are called document modication certicates, whereas
those for ow policies are called ow policy modication certicates. These certicates
are used by a subject who has modied a document/ow policy portion, to prove its
right of modifying that portion to the subsequent receivers of the package.
2For simplicity, we consider the data content associated with an element as an attribute, denoted as
\dc".
3Here and in what follows we use the dot notation to denote a component of a given structure.37
We do not provide certicates for add element and add attribute privileges
because new inserted nodes should be labeled according to the stated DO's access
control policies, thus requiring an additional centralized marking phase.
Denition 3.4.2 (Document Modication Certicate). Let d be an XML doc-
ument managed by the DO and let PB be its policy base. Let Auth P(d)  PB be
the set of authoring access control policies that apply to d, and let acp be a policy in
Auth P(d). Let Sbj PK(acp) be the set of public keys of subjects authorized to modify
d according to acp. A document modication certicate dmc, generated according to
acp, is a tuple (cert id, doc id, priv, sbj pk, obj, signature), where: cert id is the cer-
ticate identier that univocally identies a document modication certicate among
those generated by the DO; doc id is the identier of d; priv is the privilege contained
in acp; sbj pk 2 Sbj PK(acp); obj is one or a set of document regions where sbj has
privilege priv over them according to the acp; signature is the digital signature of DO
over the certicate.
Example 6 Consider user Ann, an administrator belonging to the hospital H1. Con-
sider moreover the document in Figure 3.1 and the access control policies in Fig-
ure 3.2(b). Furthermore, we assume that: R1 is the identier of the document
region corresponding to: //Doctor[hospital =\H1"]/Num of use, whereas R2 is the
region containing the document atomic elements corresponding to //Doctor[hospital
=\H1"]/Positive. Then, (10, Survey, delete attr, PKAnn, R1, signature) 4 is a valid
certicate. Since according to the DO's access control policies, Ann is authorized to
delete the atomic elements belonging to R1. By contrast, (22, Survey, delete attr,
PKAnn, R2, signature) is not a valid certicate, since Ann can only view the atomic
elements belonging to R2.
We omit the description of the ow policy modication certicates, since they are
very similar to the document modication certicates.
4With the notation PKs we denote the public key associated with subject s.38
3.4.2 Document control information
Table 3.1
Modication declaration structure
Notation Structure Semantics
ReceiverSpec (..., DocDecl, ...) Single receiver specication information
inserted by the corresponding receiver
DocDecl (Doc-UpAttr-Decl, Modication declaration inserted by a
Doc-DelAttr-Decl, receiver when it modies the document
Doc-DelEl-Decl)
Doc-UpAttr-Decl set of r id document region ids declared as updated
Doc-DelAttr-Decl set of (r id, del-docae) Declaration inserted by the receiver when it
deletes some attributes of region r id
del-docae set of docae id set of document atomic elements (attributes)
declared as deleted by the receiver
Doc-DelEl-Decl set of (doc-root id, del-reg) deletion declaration of some sub-trees
root at doc-root id
del-reg set of r id set of region ids involved in the deletion
The update of the document requires the insertion in the ow policy attachment
some modication declarations, having the structure reported in Table 3.1. More-
over, at the end of the document update, sc must insert in the document, for each
modication operation executed on the document, some control information. This
guarantees subsequent receivers that sc possesses the privilege required to execute
that operation, and, in case the privilege is update attr, it must compute a new
signature on the updated content.
Each document atomic element is marked with a label containing the set of access
control policies that apply to it. We can distinguish two main categories of document
atomic elements, according to the privileges of those policies: non-deletable atomic
elements and deletable atomic elements. Since a deletable element requires the com-
putation of additional control information wrt a non-deletable one, in this way, we
can minimize the amount of control information to be computed and inserted in the
document package. Examples of deletable atomic elements are attributes to which
at least an access control policy with the delete attr privilege applies or attributes
and tags to which at least an access control policy with a delete elemt privilege39
applies. Table 3.2 shows control data structures associated with both the categories,
whereas Table 3.3 presents the components of the structures introduced in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2
Control data structures for document atomic elements
Name Notation Structure Semantics
Control structure NDAE LIST list of TNDAE, one Control information
for non-deletable for each non-deletable associated with the
document atomic document atomic element non-deletable document
elements of d belonging to a atomic elements of d belonging
particular region r id to a particular region r id
Control tuple for TNDAE (docae id, position, Information corresponding
non-deletable data) to a non deletable
document atomic atomic element docae
element of a document d
Control structure DAE LIST list of TDAE, one Control information
for deletable for each deletable associated with the
document atomic document atomic deletable document atomic
elements element of d belonging to elements of d belonging
a particular region r id to a particular region r id
Control tuple for TDAE (docae id, position, Information corresponding
deletable data, h docae) to a deletable document
document atomic atomic element docae
element of a document d
Table 3.3
Components of the control data structures for document atomic elements
Component Semantics
docae id identier of the document atomic element docae
position value that species where docae's components are located in the document
data encrypted docae's content
h docae hash value computed over the data component
Similarly, document regions generated by the document marking can be divided in
non-modiable and modiable regions. A region is non-modiable if all policies that
apply to it contain only browsing privileges (i.e., view, navigate, and browse all);
a region is modiable otherwise. Table 3.4 presents the control data structures for
non-modiable regions, whereas Table 3.5 illustrates the semantics of components
presented in Table 3.4. We use character () to denote the string concatenation
operator, whereas we use the notation (
P
x2ListX x) to denote the concatenation of
all the elements belonging to ListX, in the order in which they are listed. Modiable40
regions can be further classied into ve sub-categories, according to the dierent
authoring privileges contained in the access control policies that apply to them. This
distinction is made for eciency purposes. Indeed, in this way, we maximize the
amount of content statically protected by specic control information and we also
reduce the total amount of control information needed to allow integrity check of a
region, thus reducing the time required for the integrity check procedure executed by
the protocols.
Table 3.4
Control data structures for non-modiable document regions
Name Notation Structure Semantics
Control structure for NMR list of TNMR, one for Information used by a subject to
non-modiable each non-modiable verify integrity of non-modiable
document regions region of d document regions of d
Control tuple for TNMR (r id, NDAE LIST, Information corresponding
non-modiable h nmr static) to a specic non-modiable
document regions document region r id of d
Table 3.5
Components of the control data structures for non-modiable document regions
Component Semantics
r id identier of a non-modiable document region of a document d
h nmr static hash value computed over NDAE LIST
belonging to r id: H(
P
t2NMR[r id]:NDAE LIST t.docae id  t.position  t.data)
Table 3.6 presents these ve sub-categories, giving for each sub-category the corre-
sponding authoring privileges. For example, the set of authoring privileges contained
in the access control policies that apply to a region classied as PDUR must be equal
to fupdate attr, delete attrg.
Without lack of generality, in the following we focus only on fully deletable and
updatable regions (FDUR), because they are the modiable regions on which the
whole set of authoring privileges supported by our model can be exercised. Thus, they
represent the most general and complex modiable region sub-category. According to
this assumption, Table 3.7 presents control data structures for FDUR regions only,41
Table 3.6
Modiable region classication
Sub-category Notation Privileges
Updatable regions UR fupdate attrg
Partially deletable regions PDR fdelete attrg
Fully deletable regions FDR fdelete elemtg or fdelete elemt delete attrg
Partially deletable and updatable regions PDUR fupdate attr, delete attrg
Fully deletable and updatable regions FDUR fupdate attr, delete elemtg or
fupdate attr, delete elemt delete attrg
Table 3.7
Control data structures for modiable document regions
Name Notation Structure Semantics
Control structure for DMR (UR, PDR, FDR, Information used to
document modiable PDUR, FDUR, verify correctness of
regions delete elmt cert) document modiable regions
... ... ... ...
Control structure for FDUR list of TFDUR, one Information used by a
fully deletable and for each fully deletable subject to verify integrity of
updatable regions and updatable region FDUR regions
Control tuple for TFDUR (r id, DAE LIST, Information
fully deletable and h fdur static, sig fdudocae, corresponding to a
updatable regions update cert, specic FDUR
delete attr cert) region r id
whereas Table 3.8 presents the components of the introduced data structures. With
reference to Table 3.8, the delete elmt cert component contains the certicates with
delete elemt privilege, inserted by subjects when they exercised their modication
rights, that apply to disjoint set of atomic elements, thus dened non-overlapping
certicates.
The signature generated by the last subject that has modied the content of a
modiable region is computed on the components h docae associated with the atomic
elements belonging to that region and not on their content (data component). Such
signature is used to check the integrity of the region. That is, we need to check
the integrity of the components h docae and then check the correspondence between
each h docae component and the corresponding atomic element content (component42
Table 3.8
Components of the control data structures for FDUR
Component Meaning and formal specication
delete elmt cert it contains non-overlapping authoring certicates, with delete elemt privilege
inserted by the subjects that have executed a deletion over document regions
r id identier of a modiable document region
h fdur static hash value computed by DO over docae id, position and h docae of the
document atomic elements that are tags and also over docae id and position
components of the document atomic elements that are attributes listed in
DAE LIST belonging to r id: H( (
P
t2FDUR[r id]:DAE LIST;type(t)=tags
t.docae id  t.position  t.h docae)  (
P
t2FDUR[r id]:DAE LIST;type(t)=attribute
t:docae id t.position) )
sig fdudocae digital signature computed over the h docae component of all the
document atomic elements that are attributes listed in DAE LIST
belonging to r id by the last subject (slast) that has modied the region and
whose modication declaration is contained in the receiver specication
identied by the information: (fpa-id, ver, rs-id, orig), where fpa-id is a fpa
identier, ver is a fpa version, rs-id is a receiver specication identier and
orig is a fpa originator
Sslast( (
P
t2FDUR[r id]:DAE LIST;type(t)=attribute t.h docae)  fpa-id
 ver  rs-id  orig )
update cert it contains the authoring certicate with update attr privilege inserted in a
region r id by the last subject that has updated that region
delete attr cert it contains the authoring certicate with delete attr privilege inserted in a
region r id by the last subject that has deleted at least one attribute of that
region
data), only for those elements not declared as deleted. The same must be done for
modication operations executed on the ow policy.
3.5 General system overview
Parties involved in the collaborative update process are: a Cooperative Group,
denoted as CG, a Delegates Group, denoted as DG, and the DO. Subjects belonging
to CG are chosen by the DO at the beginning of the process. They are the only ones
that can be chosen to be the receivers of the XML document. CG can contain an
unlimited number of Byzantine subjects. DG is a set of subjects also chosen by the
DO at the beginning of the update process. They are responsible for checking the ow
policy integrity (Fpa-Checking) at each step of the process and, whenever required
by a subject in CG, to execute document content recovery. The set of delegates is43
partitioned into three subsets: the set of Byzantine delegates (B, with jBj  0), the
set of operative delegates (OP, with jOPj  0), and the set of down delegates (D, with
jDj  0). More precisely, operative delegates obey the protocol and are reachable by
the subjects, whereas down delegates are unreachable. A down delegate can become
operative again, whereas an operative delegate goes down whenever a failure occurs.
Note, for each delegate in DG, no one can tell whether it belongs to B, D, or OP at
the beginning of the update.
The DO is the subject who generates the XML document package (DocDO) to
be updated and the associated ow policy attachment (FpaDO). This subject also
species the set of access control policies that apply to DocDO and the set of ow
modication rules that apply to FpaDO.
During the update process, the document generated by the DO is sent to a rst
chosen subject in CG. Each subject sc (except the rst one) in CG performs the
document integrity checking when it receives it, according to the control information
in the document it received from the previous subject, and the Fpa it received from the
delegates. Whenever an error occurs to the document content, the subject contacts
all delegates in DG to start a recovery. At the end of this recovery, the subject obtains
the last correct version of the document and can thus update the document according
to its modication rights. During recovery, delegates interact with subjects in CG to
obtain the last correct version of the document and build the recovered document to
be sent to the requester.
After subject sc executes its operations on the document and/or Fpa according to
the privileges it possesses, it will insert certicates which can be veried by the later
subjects. sc then sends the Fpa to DG for Fpa Checking. That is, sc should have
Q signatures from delegates which approve the current version of Fpa (as sc may
modify the Fpa). Before sc sends the document to the next subject, it will make all
operative delegates' states stable (this is called Change-Delegates-State). That is, sc
will send to all delegates Fpa which is signed by at least Q delegates. Upon receiving
the message, each operative delegate will forward this message to other delegates if44
the message is correct (Fpa is signed by at least Q delegates). Thus all operative
delegates will have the same Fpa. Also, if sc requested recovery of the document,
it also needs to send the recovered document version which is signed by at least Q
delegates. The purpose of Change-Delegates-State is to ensure that all operative
delegates have the same information. That is, they have the same Fpa, recovered
document version, etc. Finally, sc sends the document to the next subject according
to the ow policy attachment content. All delegates will send the approved Fpa to
the next subject.
After the last subject in the Fpa sends the document to the DO, if the document is
correct, the DO sends a message to end the process. Otherwise, the DO requests the
DG to recover the document in order to get the last correct version of the document.
Before we describe our protocols in detail, we rst present our assumptions of the
system and how to set the parameters.
3.5.1 Assumptions
Our approach relies on a set of assumptions. First, we assume that the DO,
each delegate and each subject involved in the update process possesses a private
key and that all the other parties know or can retrieve the public key of each other.
The DO is in charge of informing, at the beginning, all subjects and delegates of
which users compose CG and DG. Moreover, we assume that there is a nite upper
bound on message transmission time. This means that if an honest party sends a
message to another honest and reachable party, the message is received by a xed
amount of time (MTTIME). Each sent message is always signed by the sender for
integrity and authentication purposes. To avoid deadlocks caused by the malicious
behavior of a Byzantine subject sc, a Rollback procedure is executed to replace sc with
another subject after a xed amount of time by the last change of state executed by
an operative delegate.5
5In the protocols specied in this paper, we do not address this issue, that it is assumed to be a
parallel process auditing the delegate behaviour and starting its task when needed.45
3.5.2 Protocol parameters setting
At the beginning of the update process, the DO has to set two parameters: b
and d, that respectively represent the maximum number of Byzantine delegates that
do not aect the protocol, and the maximum number of down delegates that do not
delay the protocol. The parameter b may be set by the system with the default vale
of 0, or may be set by the DO. Value d is set as dc  fe where f is an estimated
average number of failures proposed by the system and c is the correction parameter
set by the DO, the default value of which is 1.
Another important parameter op, which is the number of operative delegates, is
strictly related to Quorum Q, which is the minimum number of delegates required
for making progress. The relationship between op and Q is:
op  Q (constraint 1)
b + (op + d)=2 < Q (constraint 2)
Constraint 1 states that op must be greater than or equal to Q, because in case
Byzantine delegates do not answer a request, only operative delegates will be able to
sign a message content for which the protocol requires at least Q valid signatures.
Constraint 2 enforces that a Byzantine cannot able to obtain two sets of valid
signatures of cardinality at least equal to Q for two dierent messages of the same
type, or for two messages of the same priority, exchanged in the same step, when
there is the maximum number of Byzantine delegates and no down delegate.6 The
minimum value of op that assures all the above requirements is (2b + d + 1) and the
corresponding value for Q is (2b + d + 1) too.
3.6 Distributed and cooperative update process protocols
Our approach relies on a suite of protocols, namely: the protocol executed by the
DO (Document Originator Protocol); the protocol executed by the subjects in CG
6More details about message types/priorities are presented in Section 3.6.46
(Subject Protocol); and the protocol executed by the operative delegates (Delegate
Protocol). First, we explain some terminologies and data structures we used in these
protocols.
3.6.1 Terminology and structures
We call Statex
dl the state associated with a delegate dl 2 OP at step x of the
process. We call step all the operations/interactions executed by a subject sc 2 CG
and delegates, from the reception of the document and ow policy attachment by sc, to
the delivery of the updated document to the next receiver (snext 2 CG). The complete
cooperative and distributed update process thus consists of a set of steps. Statex
dl
which is stored in the local storage of dl, contains following components that can be
possibly updated step by step: a Document (Doc), a ow policy attachment (Fpa),
a structure containing the invalid modication document declarations (IMDD), a
structure used during the recovery that indicates when the last recovery occurred for
each region (LSRR), a vector of progressive numbers used to protect against replay
attacks (NIP, where IP = CG [DG [fDOg). For a delegate dl 2 OP, a step x ends
and the subsequent one (x + 1) begins when dl makes State
x+1
dl stable, that is, the
values of modiable information contained in Statex
dl are replaced with the new ones,
according to the information contained in the last correct message sent by sc to all
delegates.
Next, we explain some data structures used by a delegate in detail.
 IMDD (Invalid Modication Document Declarations) This structure contains
invalid declarations inserted during each recovery (see example 3.6.1). Invalid
declarations are stored in IMDD according to the subject that has inserted
them in Fpa, and according to the type of operation associated with it (up-
date attr/delete attr/delete elmt privilege). A subject is identied in IMDD
through the information that species its position in Fpa at the time of insertion
of that declaration in Fpa itself.47
Example 7 Don did not extend the survey path to his nurse Cathy. However,
Cathy modied the attribute rate lled by Don and inserted in the document
control information and Fpa her modication declarations. When the document
passed to Lynn, who is the administrative sta of the hospital, she found the
document corrupted. Lynn asked notaries for a recovery. Notaries will recover
the document by undoing Cathy's modications, and put Cathy's modication
declarations into IMDD.
 LSRR (Last Saved Region Recovery) This structure is used by a delegate during
the recovery. It stores, for each modiable region, the information that identies
the subject in Fpa that has generated the last detected as corrupted version
of the document wrt that region. During a recovery, only subjects that have
declared some modications on a region to be recovered and that appear in
Fpa in a position greater than that stored in LSRR for that region, will be
contacted to obtain the most recent correct region content. Since previous
recovery has stored the most recent correct region content wrt the declarations
in Fpa inserted by subjects in a position less than that stored in LSRR for
that region, the recovery process will use it to recover the region if it does not
receive a more recent correct region content by the contacted subjects.
 NIP This structure is a vector of progressive numbers, initially sets to all
zeros, one for each party involved in the process. It is used to keep track of the
number of steps a subject or the DO has taken part in, and how many times
a delegate has requested an agreement. Whenever a subject/DO participates
in a step, the corresponding progressive number is increased. The indication of
the receiver in the messages sent by a delegate, together with the insertion of
the value stored in NIP, which corresponds to that receiver, prevents Byzantine
subjects and/or Byzantine delegates from replaying messages exchanged in a
step x during a step y, with y > x.48
 Queue This structure stores all the received messages. During a generic step x,
a delegate needs a strategy to choose among all the received messages the next
one to process. This strategy is called received messages scheduling policy and
it is applied each time a message has been completely processed or when the
time assigned to a process that processes a message ends. This policy collects
among all the messages in Queue only the messages valid according to Statex,
and the values of the previous introduced variables. Then, it selects from this
set the messages with higher priority and in case of more than one message, the
message received rst.
 state This variable contains a string which indicates the state in which the
delegate is. For example, the value norec for this variable indicates that the
delegate has not yet requested a recovery or it is completing a step without the
need of a recovery.
 requests This variable is an integer, indicates the number of processed requests
wrt the value of variable state. If no recovery has been requested, variable
requests reaches at most value 1, whereas it reaches value 2 in presence of
recovery. Variable state and requests are used to avoid replay attacks within
the same step.
The Subject Protocol also makes use of variable state to represent the action the
subject is executing or has just executed. A subject also use a structure NCG which
is similar to NIP, to keep track of the number of steps all subjects have taken part
in. Whenever a subject s sends a message, this message contains the progressive
number associated with s (NCG[s]). This information is used by a receiver to discard
old messages.
Parties involved in a cooperative and distributed update process communicate by
exchanging messages. Table 3.9 gives more details about the exchanged messages.
In the table, messages are presented in terms of type, sender, receiver(s), and their
complete structure and semantics. Only messages received by a delegate have associ-49
ated a priority. This is because only Down Delegate and Delegate Protocols use this
information to choose the next message to process. Figure 3.5 shows the message
exchanged between the involved parties.
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Table 3.9
Messages
P Type Sender Rcvr(s) Content and Semantics
- init-dg DO DG (init-dg, d id, DocDO, FpaDO, CG, DG)
Message sent by the DO to all
delegates containing the original version of the document,
the initial ow policy attachment and the set of delegates
and subjects involved in the process
- init-cg DO CG (init-cg, d id, regkeyss;docmodcerts;fpmodcerts;CG;DG)
Message sent by the DO to each subject s
containing s's decryption keys, document/ow policy
certicates and the set of subjects and delegates
0 agreement dl 2 D DG (agreement)
Message sent by a down delegate to all delegates
in DG to receive information needed to reach the same
state of the operative delegates
- agreement-resp DG dl 2 D (agreement-resp, history;hpm;agreements;dl;NIP[dl])
Message sent by delegates to a down delegate containing
the history of all previous steps, in terms of messages of
type fw-signed-fpa-nr or fw-signed-fpa-ar that cause the
step change (history), their last processed message (hpm),
all the received but not still processed agreement messages
(agreements) and information required to prevent other
delegates to replay this message (a progressive number and
the public key of the down delegate receiver)
1 err sc 2 DG (err, m;Ssbj(m);MReg;NCG[sc])
CG j DO Message sent by the current subject/DO to all delegates when
an error occurs to the document content to collect (b + 1)
recovery versions
- rec DG sc 2 (rec, IMDDdlc;MReg;Docdlc;sbj;nsbj)
CG j DO Message sent by delegates to the current subject/DO
containing the result of their recovery: a Doc and the
updated IMDD structure
2 fw-rec sc 2 CG DG (fw-rec, fm;Sdl(m)gdl2D)
Message sent by the current subject to all delegates to
receive the last correct document version wrt its accessible
modiable regions, obtained unifying the jDj = (b + 1)
forwarded recovery versions
- rec-merge DG sc 2 CG (rec-merge, IMDDdlc;MReg;Docdlc;sbj;nsbj)
Message sent by delegates to the current subject containing
a Doc, union of the (b + 1) received recoveries, and the IMDD
structure, updated according to the (b + 1) received recoveries
3 new-fpa-nr sc 2 CG DG (new-fpa-nr,Fpasc)
Message sent by the current subject to all delegates to
propose a new Fpa to be made stable, in absence of recovery
- signed-fpa-nr DG sc 2 CG (signed-fpa-nr, Fpa)
Message sent by delegates to the current subject if the
proposed Fpa is correct, in absence of recovery
3 new-fpa-ar sc 2 CG DG (new-fpa-ar,Fpasc)
Message sent by the current subject to all delegates to
propose a new Fpa to be made stable, after a recovery
- signed-fpa-ar DG sc 2 CG (signed-fpa-ar, Fpa)
Message sent by delegates to the current subject if the
proposed Fpa is correct, after a recovery
4 fw-signed-fpa-nr sc 2 DG (fw-signed-fpa-nr, m;fSdl(m)gdl2Q)
CG j DG Message sent by the current subject to all delegates and then
forwarded by delegates to each other delegate to make stable
the Fpa contained in m and previously signed by jQj = Q
delegates
4 fw-signed-fpa-ar sc 2 DG (fw-signed-fpa-ar, m;fSdl(m)gdl2Q; b m;fSdl(b m)gdl2 b Q)
CG j DG Message sent by the current subject to all delegates and then
forwarded by delegates to each other delegate to make stable
the Doc contained in b m and the Fpa contained in m and
previously signed by jQj = j b Qj = Q delegates
5 end DO DG [ CG (end, d id)
end the update process51
3.6.2 DO protocol
The DO chooses CG and DG, and distributes to all delegates information (DocDO,
FpaDO, CG, DG). Then, it distributes the decryption keys and document/ow policy
modication certicates to the corresponding subjects in CG. Finally, the DO sends
to the rst subject the DO's version of the document to be updated (DocDO) and
the DO's version of the associated ow policy attachment (FpaDO).
At the end of update, the DO receives from the last receiver subject (sbj) in Fpa
a message m containing the document (Docsbj) and a message signed by (2b+d+1)
delegates containing Fpa and IMDD. It checks the document integrity and, if an
error occurs, it sends to all delegates an error message for recovery. Each delegate
dl 2 DG generates a document recovery version by contacting subjects in CG and
then sends a message containing its version to the DO. The DO accepts the rst
(b+1) messages from the delegates and then composes them to obtain the last correct
document version. 7 The original document is thus replaced by this new document.
At this point, the DO sends a message (end;d id) to all delegates and subjects, to end
the cooperative update process concerning document with identier equal to d id.
3.6.3 Subject protocol
When subject sc 2 CG receives a message m from a subject sbj 2 CG, and at least
b + 1 messages from dierent delegates such that the structure of Fpa and IMDD
are all the same from these messages of the delegates, it can check if m contains a
corrupted document according to the received IMDD and Fpa. As we will see in the
delegate protocol, an operative delegate will not send Fpa and IMDD to a subject
unless at least (2b + d + 1) delegates approves this Fpa and IMDD.
If there is no error in m, sc executes the operation on the document. Otherwise, it
sends to all delegates a recovery message to obtain the last correct document version
wrt the set of regions it can access.
7More details about the recovery functionality are presented in Section 3.7.52
sc accepts the recovery reply messages from (b+1) delegates and then puts these
messages in a message m and sends m to all delegates. Next, sc waits to receive
recovery messages from at least (2b + d + 1) delegates. The recovery results from
these (2b+d+1) delegates must be the same. Then this nishes the recovery and sc
can start operations on the correct document version.
After executing the operation on the document and/or Fpa, sc has to send its
updated Fpa to all delegates in order to be checked and signed (This is called
Fpa Checking). If no recovery has been requested by sc during the step, sc sends
a message (new-fpa-nr,Fpasc) to all delegates; a message (new-fpa-ar,Fpasc) is sent
otherwise. sc has to send to each delegate a message whose type depends on whether
it has requested a recovery or not in the step. A delegate veries if the updated Fpa
is correct, that is, if sc has the certicates which authorize it to update the Fpa and it
inserted these certicates in the Fpa. If so, the delegate signs the message containing
the Fpa and sends it back. Example 8 illustrates the importance of Fpa Checking.
Example 8 When Don extends the ow path by letting his nurse Cathy update the
survey, he should get enough signatures (at least of Q) from delegates by requesting
Fpa Checking for the new proposed ow path. Subsequent modication made by Cathy
will be valid if she inserts her credentials (see Figure 3.3). However, if Don does not
extend the ow path, any modication made by Cathy will be invalid, even though she
inserts her credentials. Fpa Checking is also important to prevent Byzantine delegates
from damaging the integrity of the update. As previously mentioned in Section 3.1,
if a Byzantine delegate deleted what Cathy lled in because the information does not
favor the drug company he favors, he must have a message from Don who proposed
the ow path without extension. However, he could not get such message.
When sc receives (2b+d+1) such signatures from delegates, it is ready to change
delegate state. That is, before sending the document to the next subject, sc has to
notify all delegates the document recovery version and corresponding IMDD struc-
ture generated during the recovery, if any, and the correct Fpa proposed. sc does53
this by sending a message e m to all delegate. If no recovery happened in the step, e m
is of type fw-signed-fpa-nr and it contains the new Fpa and (2b + d + 1) signatures
of it from delegates. Otherwise, e m is of type of fw-signed-fpa-ar and it contains: 1)
message m of type fw-signed-fpa-ar containing the new Fpa; 2) (2b + d + 1) delegate
signatures on m; 3) message b m of type rec-merge containing the document recovery
version and associated IMDD structure; 4) (2b+d+1) delegate signatures computed
on b m.
After sc sends e m, it sends the document to the next subject according to the
Fpa. sc needs to wait until receiving a message from the DO indicating that the
update process ends. Before the update process end, some delegates may contact sc
for recovering the document.
As we will see in the delegate protocol, a subject cannot generate a valid message
of type fw-signed-fpa-nr and another valid message of type fw-signed-fpa-ar in the
same step, because the protocols prevent this subject from collecting Q signatures
for a message of type new-fpa-nr and Q signatures for a message of type new-fpa-ar.
Indeed, in the same step, a delegate does not accept messages with the same priority.
Example 9 After Don extended the path and got Fpa Checking, the document passed
to Cathy. Cathy lled in parts of the survey. Later on, a Byzantine delegate cannot
undo Cathy's update, even by colluding with Don. This is because at least Q delegates
should sign Fpa. Don cannot get Q delegates sign a dierent Fpa.
3.6.4 Delegate protocol
The initial state of a delegate is norec. If a delegate dl receives a recovery message
from sbj who is in CG, dl checks the following before doing any recovery: 1) according
to the Fpa stored in the current state, sbj should be the subject doing update process
now. As we will show later, all operative delegate always have the same and correct
Fpa at each step, due to the State consistancy; 2) the request associated with the
current step is 0; 3) current state variable is norec; 4) the document contained in54
the recovery message is signed by a previous subject who is before sbj in the Fpa;
5) this is not a replay attack, according to the information stored in NIP. If there is
any error, dl just ignores the message. Otherwise, it generates a document recovery
version and the corresponding IMDD updated structure by contacting subjects in
CG and then sends to sbj a message containing the generated information.
If dl receives from sbj a message m of type fw-rec, it will check the following: 1)
variable state is rec; 2) sbj 2 CG; 3) variable requests is 0; 4) according to the Fpa,
sbj is the current subject who is updating the document; 5) there are (b+1) recovery
messages signed by dierent delegates. If there is no error, dl sets requests = 1 and
m as the hpm; then it generates a merge version of Doc and IMDD and sends it to
sbj.
When dl receives a message m from sbj 2 CG for Fpa Checking, it checks the
following. If the message m is of type new-fpa-nr, state variable must be norec and
requests must be equal to 0, as this is the rst request from sbj in this step. If the
message m is of type new-fpa-ar, state variable must be rec and requests must be
equal to 1. Also, from the Fpa stored in dl's State, sbj should be the current subject
requesting for Fpa Checking. If all above are satised, dl increases the variable
requests by 1 and set m as the hpm. dl then checks the integrity of the proposed
Fpa from sbj. If no error in the proposed Fpa, dl sends a signed message of type
signed-fpa-nr or type signed-fpa-nr to sbj, depending whether a recovery happened
or not in this step.
When dl receives a message m of type fw-signed-fpa-nr or fw-signed-fpa-ar from
sbj for commit the step, it checks the following. 1) In the case that m is of type fw-
signed-fpa-nr, them m must contain a message m of type signed-fpa-nr and (2b+d+1)
delegate signatures on m. This indicates that at least (2b + d + 1) delegates agree
with the Fpa proposed in m. 2) In the case that m is of type fw-signed-fpa-ar,
them m must contain a message m of type signed-fpa-ar and (2b + d + 1) delegate
signatures on m. Also, m must contain a message e m of type rec-merge which contains
a recovered version of document and the corresponding IMDD, and (2b + d + 1)55
delegate signatures on e m. If the above are satised and the message is not a replay
attack according to the information stored in NIP , dl updates the components of
State, that is, it sets the variable state as norec, requests = 0, hpm = m and puts
m into history. dl also sends the received message m to other delegates, in case sbj
did not send m to them. So all the operative delegates will have the same state.
That is, in case m of type fw-signed-fpa-ar, all operative delegates set components of
their State, such as the current document version, IMDD, LSRR etc. according to
the one contained in e m. dl thus nishes a step, and State is stable. It then sends a
message containing Fpa and IMDD to the next subject in the path.
The designed protocols assure that each operative delegate signs only once such
information at each step, thus preventing Byzantine subjects from obtaining two
dierent contents signed by at least Q distinct delegates and forcing dierent dele-
gates, such as dli;dlj 2 OP, to make stable State
x+1
dli and State
x+1
dlj with State
x+1
dli 6=
State
x+1
dlj .
3.7 Recovery
The goal of recovery is to retrieve the last correct version of the regions accessible
by sc. It accomplishes this task by contacting subjects in CG that have received till
that point at least a document package and that have executed at least a modication
operation on at least one region accessible by sc. Also, it is desirable to limit as
much as possible the number of subjects to be contacted. Correctness of a region is
determined according to the set of valid modication declarations inserted in Fpa.
A declaration of deletion of a document sub-tree is valid if 1) a certicate cor-
responding to this declaration exists or 2) a certicate corresponding to a deletion
declaration of a document sub-tree that includes the deleted sub-tree exists.
A delete attr modication declaration is valid if the subject that has inserted
this declaration in Fpa has also inserted in the document control information of the
currently analyzed document version a corresponding certicate. A delete attr mod-56
ication declaration is also valid if it is not evaluated as invalid till that point and
another valid subsequent delete attr declaration exists in Fpa. That is, A delete attr
declaration is considered valid if a subsequent subject s will correctly exercise the
delete attr privilege on the same region. The same strategy applies to update attr
and delete elemt modication declarations. Even more, a valid declaration for the
deletion of a sub-tree a, and its corresponding certicate, makes other not yet evalu-
ated deletions of a sub-tree b such that b  a, valid. This implies that a recovery is
done from backwards.
An update attr declaration is valid in presence of a proper certicate and when
the content of h docae components associated with elements of the modied region
are correct wrt the signature computed by the subject who generated the declaration.
Moreover, content of atomic elements not declared as deleted must be correct wrt the
corresponding h docae component.
Next, we give a high level description of the recovery algorithm. This algorithm
is used by a delegate to generate a document recovery version and the corresponding
IMDD structure.
Initially, the algorithm replaces all non-modiable information in the document
to be recovered (Doc), with those in the stable version of the document (Docst).
Then function Rec-MDD-Collection collects all modication declarations, not yet
inserted in the stable version of IMDD and associated with at least a region in
MReg, in structure MDD. Each delete attr/update attr declaration, among the
previous selected ones, is collected if it is present in a position of Fpa greater than
the position stored in LSRR corresponding to the region to which the modication
declaration is associated with. Each delete attr modication declaration (dad) in
MDD associated with a region r contains: 1) the r's identier, 2) the cumulative set
of elements declared as deleted, that is, the union of the sets of elements declared as
deleted by all the delete attr declarations, for r, in MDD that precede dad in Fpa
and the set of elements specied in dad, and 3) the public key of the subject that has57
generated dad. In MDD are also inserted, for each region in MReg, the most recent
valid update attr/delete attr declarations determined during the last recovery.
The algorithm considers the position in Fpa corresponding to the subject (sbj(Doc))
that has generated the corrupted document to be recovered as the initial recovery po-
sition. Component set-del-docae will contain all the elements declared as deleted in
valid delete elemt/delete attr declarations. It analyzes declarations in MDD until
the set is empty and when required it contacts a subject to obtain a document ver-
sion against which to evaluate the declarations in MDD. The algorithm starts by
the document version to be recovered and then, if required, other document versions
are obtained in reverse order wrt the order associated with receiver specications in
Fpa.
When the algorithm analyzes certicates associated with delete elemt privileges,
it removes all certicates that are not correct, or that are not associated with a
delete elemt declaration, or that are contained in another certicate. Delete elemt
declarations are considered valid according to the strategy we described at the be-
ginning of this Section. Elements declared as deleted in these valid declarations are
saved in set-del-docae component.
Similarly, the algorithm analyzes each region for which there exists a delete attr
declaration in MDD. It determines the most recent delete attr declaration in MDD
for a region r (dad). If its position is less than or equal to that stored in LSRR for r,
then there are no valid delete attr declarations after the last recovery. Therefore the
certicate inserted in Doc is copied by Docst, also inserting in set-del-docae the set of
elements declared as deleted associated with dad in MDD. If there is a corresponding
correct certicate in the currently analyzed document version, then it inserts in Doc
this certicate, saves all elements declared as deleted in set-del-docae, and removes
from MDD all delete attr declarations associated with r. At point 5, the algorithm
analyzes update attr declarations.
Next, at point 7 all declarations with position in the Fpa equal to that of the
currently analyzed document version are removed from MDD, since no other sub-58
sequently required document version can make them valid. They are inserted in
IMDD.
Then, the algorithm determines the set decl set which contains the declarations of
the subject who is at the highest position of the Fpa among these subjects who made
declarations in MDD. If at least one declaration is at a position greater than that
stored in LSRR for the corresponding region, then a request is sent to the subject that
has generated this set of declarations to obtain its last stored document version, if this
subject has not been contacted up to that point. If the subject is unreachable, the
algorithm removes decl set from MDD and inserts decl set in IMDD, then it deter-
mines the new value of decl set according to the content of MDD. When decl set does
not contain anymore delete elemt declarations and delete attr/update attr declara-
tions with position greater than that stored in LSRR for the corresponding region,
the algorithm removes decl set from MDD and for each declaration in decl set it
copies content and certicate (in case of update attr declaration) or only certicate
(in case of delete attr declaration) in Doc from the stable document version Docst.
Finally, when MDD is empty, the algorithm sets to null all elements of Doc saved
in set-del-docae. The algorithm ends returning Doc, the produced document recovery
version, and the corresponding updated IMDD structure.
Given (b + 1) document recovery versions, there must be one that is consistent
with these of all operative delegates. All operative delegates will sign such one and
send it to the requester. A recovery responses merge algorithm can be found in [55]).
3.8 Performance evaluation
This section evaluates the performance of our approach. We compare it with the
case that only one party (trusted) is involved for ow path integrity checking and
document recovery.59
3.8.1 Experimental setup
We measure the time to complete one step. Both delegates (or the trusted party)
and subjects ran on identical Solaris workstations. These workstations have 450MHz
CPUs and 2GB of memory. The network bandwidth is 100MB/s. Point-to-point
communications is implemented using TCP. RSA of 1024-bit modulus is used for
digital signatures. To ensure the condentiality of the document, AES with a key
size of 256 bit is used for encryption.
We performed the experiment with 1 Byzantine delegate, 0 down delegate. There-
fore, there are 3 operative delegates; totally 4 delegates. Fpa is about 5KB and the
document is 100KB.
3.8.2 Results
Figure 3.6 reports the time complexity when no recovery is requested. In this
case, our approach does not have much more delay than the one-party approach.
The overhead introduced in our approach is from the time spending on the change-
delegate-state sub-phase. This sub-phase requires the subject to collect 3 signatures
on the proposed Fpa and then broadcast them to all delegates, which takes less
than 10ms. This low overhead is due to the fact that the subject does not need to
perform any encryptions or generating any signatures; it only needs to verify at most
4 signatures. Compared to the overall time (362ms) of the one-party case when the
operation time is 20ms, this overhead is only 3%. When operation time increases,
this overhead decreases.
Next, we measured the time complexity when recovery is requested. Figure 3.7
reports the results when only one subject needs to be contacted by delegates (or one-
party) for recovery of the document regions which is of size 0.5KB. As we can see,
the overall time increases for both approaches. Even for a one-party case, the time
is almost double that of no recovery. This due to the fact that the party needs to
decrypt the document, and then nd the subjects to be contacted in order to recover60
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the document. Encryption/Decryption are needed for the communication between
the subjects and the delegates (one-party). This process also requires the signatures
computation and verication, and transferring the recovered version to the requested
subject. Thus, recovery almost doubles the time needed for both approaches. How-
ever, the Byzantine approach has more overhead relative to one-party case. For
example, when the operation time is 20 ms, the Byzantine approach needs 991ms
while one party needs 647ms. The overhead is almost 35%.
This overhead is mainly due to the encryption and decryption of recovered versions
for recovery-merge operations and also the delegates sending back the merged version.61
Furthermore, the subject needs to make delegates states stable by sending the merged
version and signatures on it. We optimized performance by reducing the size of
messages for recovery merge. If the rst b + 1 recovered versions are the same, only
one copy is sent to the delegates, along with all the digital signatures of the version.
Similarly, a delegate only needs to send back the digital signature on the version that
it approves. Figure 3.8 shows the results. The overhead is now reduced to only 18%.
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3.9 Conclusion and future work
In this chapter, we have proposed an approach supporting cooperative updates in
Byzantine and failure prone distributed systems. The protocols we have developed
are resistant to a number of colluding Byzantine subjects, and they are not aected
by a maximum number of failures specied at the beginning. We have also devel-
oped a language and an infrastructure to specify dynamic paths, called ow policies,
stating which subjects have to receive the document. In particular, we provide the
possibility of modifying the specication of these ow policies during the update pro-
cess, according to the stated modications rules. Another important feature is the
recovery process provided as part of our approach. Indeed, recovery is distributed,
that is, the last correct version of the document content is built by a set of subjects,62
called delegates, using the document versions received by the contacted subjects in
CG.
We plan to extend the work presented in this paper in several directions. First,
we want to develop protocols to manage rollback. Second, we plan to extend our work
with mechanisms supporting receiver anonymity, and add element and add attribute
privileges. We also plan to relax the constraint that subjects in CG cannot be changed
once the update starts, which is currently a limitation of our approach. Finally, we
will deal with how to allow dierent subjects to concurrently update disjoint XML
document portions in a parallel distributed setting [56], giving the possibility of gen-
erating independent ow policies to be used on these portions.63
4 A CRYPTOGRAPHIC APPROACH TO ACCESS CONTROL FOR PRIVACY
PRESERVING COLLABORATIONS
In this chapter, we propose a cryptographic approach for distributed multi-party col-
laborations on document access and updating. Our solution ensures secure dynamic
group communication, access privilege privacy, and participating anonymity. We
provide security analysis for the protocol and time complexity analysis.
4.1 Introduction
Previous approaches we have developed are not scalable in that before a col-
laboration starts, each participants must receive some secret information securely.
Therefore, each collaboration involves secret control information to be sent to each
participant. Moreover, no previous approach addresses privacy in collaboration. By
privacy, we means that in a distributed environment, each party's participation and
its privileges should not be revealed to others unless necessary, during the collabo-
ration. One simple approach to ensure privacy is by letting a trusted party to fully
moderate the collaboration process. That is, a trusted party sends the data to the
rst participant, and after receiving the response, the trusted party sends the data
to the next participant. However, the communication cost in this simple approach is
high and more importantly, the trusted party is a bottleneck for collaborations.
In this chapter, we provide a scalable distributed protocol which uses crypto-
graphic techniques to provide the following properties for multi-party collaborations:
1. Dynamic group communications: As a collaboration proceeds, the group mem-
bers which are allowed to access the data can change dynamically.64
2. Data integrity: A recipient should be able to verify that the data received is
authentic, even though it receives the data from another party instead of from
the trusted party;
3. Participating anonymity and completeness: A subject has no idea of who par-
ticipates in the operation, except the one to whom it should send the data after
it nishes the operation on it. However, when a subject receives the data, it
should be able to verify that all its previous authorized subjects have accessed it
already, even though it does not know whom they are. Any missed participation
should be able to be detected by a receiver.
4. Privacy on access privilege: Each subject should know its access privilege, with-
out leaking this information to other participants (except a recipient should
know who authored the data, as this is for integrity purposes); Moreover, each
subject may access data several times, and each time, the privileges may dier-
ent from its previous privileges.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We describe our model in Section
5.2 and preliminary notations in Section 4.3. The distributed privacy preserving
document processing protocols are presented in Section 4.4. A security analysis is
detailed in Section 4.5.
4.2 Model
We model the secure multi-party collaboration by a distributed document access
and update. In such an application, several parties cooperatively update a document
according to the access control policies and data ow policies. We assume that these
policies are already dened for a document, for example, through multi-party negoti-
ation processes. A participant may appear multiple times in a data ow policy. For
each appearance, the corresponding access control policy species the access privi-65
leges. For simplicity, the privileges over the document are read, write, and denied. A
write privilege consumes the read privilege, and the default privilege is denied.
Every party involved in the collaboration is assigned a secret ID, denoted as SIDi
by the trusted party (TP). We assume that each party could be identied in public
by its public key.
4.2.1 Threats
The threats to the collaboration include:
 an unauthorized party may access the document, and thus violates the con-
dentiality of the document.
 an unauthorized party may modify the document illegally. That is, a party
which does not possess the write privilege from the access control policy may
update the document.
 a party may be skipped during the collaboration and thus violates the partici-
pation completeness of the collaboration.
Other threats to secure multi-party collaboration are that a party, even an autho-
rized party, may want to deduce the SID of the others who are participating in the
collaboration and/or their access privileges.
4.3 Preliminary
In this section, we describe the concepts that are used in our protocol.
Denition 4.3.1 A document id is identied for each collaboration. Therefore, we
denote a collaboration as G(id) where id is the document id used in the collaboration.
A document version is an incremental number starting with 0 and incrementing every
time a subject performs update privileges over it.66
Example 10 A document with identier 1211 will be accessed by A1 to A12. Suppose
the data ow path is
A1;A2;A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12
where the bold case participants (A1;A4 and A9) have updated privileges, non-bold
cased participants have read access, and others have denied access.
In the above example, document id is 1211, there are 3 version of its. Initial
version is authored by A1, then version 0 is updated by A4 to be version 1, and the
last version 2 is authored by A9 during the collaboration.
Denition 4.3.2 A session group gi(k;a;id) is formed by group members who have
read access to the version i of a document id. The group member communicate with
each other through a secret key k which is shared by the group members. The version
of the document that they have read access is authored by the party a.
In the example, g0(k1;A1;1211) = fA1;A2;A3;A4g. All members in g0 have read
access to the document modied by A1. The data is encrypted with k1 for secure group
communication. A4 is included since write privilege subsumes read access. Similarly,
g1(k2;A4;1211) = fA4;A5;A6;A7;A8;A9g. After A4 modies the document, A1, A2
or A3 is no longer able to access it, since neither of them is in g1.
Therefore, we have the following
 A multi-party collaboration G(id) consists of several gi(ki;ai;id);
 If i 6= j, then ki 6= kj; Each session group has a secret key for its group
communication.
 For any i > 1, gi(ki;ai) \ gi 1(ki 1;ai 1)  ai. For any two sequence g, their
interception contains the author of the last g.
For a collaboration G(id), we have the following denitions.67
 p: is a large prime from which a nite eld Fp is formed.
 f: f0;1g ! f0;1gp is a one way hash function
 Dynamic collaboration polynomials (DCP)
DCP = f1;2;:::;jg
where i = hPki(x);Pai(x)i and secret key polynomial Pki(x) is a polynomial
over Fp[x] and is dened as
Pki(x) =
Y
j2gi(ki;ai;id)
(x   f(SIDjkTjkr1)) + ki
and authentication polynomial Pai(x) is a polynomial over Fp[x] and is dened
as
Pai(x) =
Y
j2g(ki;ai;id)
(x   f(SIDjkTjkr2)) + PubKey(ai)
Tj is the number of times the receiver j has received the document and r1 and
r2 are random variables in Fp.
 A participant completeness polynomial (PCP) for verifying that all previous
receivers have accessed the document
PCP(x) =
Y
i2G(id)
(x   Qi)
where Qi = f(Qi 1kSIDi 1kr3) and r3 is a random variable in Fp. Qi is en-
crypted in the document;
 the next receiver set  for nding who is the next receiver.
 = f1;2;:::;jg68
where i = hi;ii, i = f(SIDikr5kTi), i = f(SIDikr4kTi)  NextPubKey
and NextPubKey is the public key of the next receiver, r4 and r5 are random
variables in Fp
4.4 Secure collaborative document processing
Before we detail the process, we rst state our assumptions.
 A party which is involved in the collaboration will be available until the end of
the collaboration.
 An authorized party will be collaborative. That is, it will send the document
to the next receiver according to the protocol.
Before a collaboration starts, the trusted party publishes f, random variables
fr1;r2;r3;r4;r5g 2 Fp, and DCP, PCP and  for each collaboration G(id). A major
dierence with previous approaches is that no secret control information needs to be
sent to each participant for each collaboration. Next we describe the collaboration
protocols.
4.4.1 Updating process protocol
A party i could calculate possible secret keys used in the collaboration by calcu-
lating the polynomial Pki(f(SIDijjTijjr1)). When it receives a document, it performs
the following steps:
1. It decrypts the document with key j:kj such that j 2 DCP.
2. If the sender of the document is the trusted party, no integrity needs to be
checked. Otherwise,
 it veries the integrity of the document according to the j:aj. That is,
the receiver calculates the PubKeyj = Pai(f(SIDijjTijjr2)) and checks if69
the digital signature signed by the PubKeyj matches the hash value of the
document content;
 it veries if all previous participants have received the document by check-
ing if PCP(Qi) = 0 where Qi is the value stored in the current version of
the document;
 If there is any error, the participant sends the received data to the data
server for recovery and its operation on the received document is done. We
will detail the recovery process later.
3. The subject checks whether it has write privileges over the document. That is,
it checks if there exist a i 2 DCP such that polynomial Pai(f(SIDikTikr2))
equals to its public key. If so, it has write access to the data, and it will increases
Ti by 1. Otherwise, it has read access.
 If the subject has read access and the document it received is from the
trusted party, however,the author of the document is another subject (this
is the case when the trusted party recovered the document), then the
subject nishes its operation on the received document. It does not need
to send anything out;
 Otherwise, the subject
(a) updates value Qi+1 to be f(QikSIDikr3) in the document;
(b) If the subject has write access, it modies the content and should sign
the message digit with its private key.
(c) nds the next subject to send by computing the public key of the next;
That is, it nds a i such that i = f(SIDikr4kTi). The next receiver
is i  f(SIDikr5kTi).
(d) If the subject only has read privileges this time over the document,
it encrypts the document using the same key with which it decrypted70
the document. Otherwise, it encrypts the document with the key ki
by calculating Pki(f(SIDijjTijjr1)).
4. The subject increases Ti by one for the document.
4.4.2 Recovery protocol
The trusted party keeps a record of session group from which the most recent
recovery request has been requested. We denote this session group as gr (note: at the
beginning, gr is null).
When the trusted party receives a recovery request from an authorized party pc,
it decides within which session group gc the error happens this time by executing
algorithm 4.1.
Algorithm: Find Group Session
Input: pc, doc, gr
Output: gr
1. set gc = g(r+1)
2. if(valid(doc))
Get from doc the session group and assign it to gc
3. for all gi 2 G(id)
nd gm s.t. m  c ^ pc 2 gm ^ 8n s.t. pc 2 gn, n  m
4. gr = gm
5. return gr
Figure 4.1. Algorithm for nding session group
After nding out the session group of the recovery document, TP gets the docu-
ment from the author of the gr. The trusted party double checks if the next recipient
of the author satised PCP(Qa) = 0 and PCP(f(Qa+1jjSIDa+1jjr3)) = 0.
Then TP will update the Qi values for the next g(r+1)'s author, and broadcasts
this to every members in the gr.71
4.5 Security analysis
Before we prove the security properties of the protocol, we rst prove that SID
is secure.
Theorem 4.5.1 No party can derive any other one's SID during the process.
Proof We prove this for the case that a party cannot derive its group member's
SIDs. All other cases do not give the adversary such advantages.
When adversary i receives a document, it could derive the secret key used for the
group gi. Therefore, the adversary knows ki, the secret key polynomial Pki. It could
only derive the
Q
j2gi(ki;ai;id) f(SIDjkTjkr1). Suppose there are only two parties in
this session group. Then the adversary can at most get the value of f(SIDjkTjkr1).
As the f is an one-way function, it is hard to nd SIDj. Therefore, no party can
derive any other one's SID during the process. 
Next, we prove that the condentiality and integrity of the document is ensured.
4.5.1 Condentiality
In order to prove that the protocol ensures data condentiality, it is enough to
prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.5.2 If a party is not in gi(ki;ai;id), then it cannot get the secret key ki
used in the group communication.
Proof We prove it according to the following cases
1. The adversary j is in gj(kj;aj;id) where i 6= j. That is, the adversary is
authorized to participate in the collaboration, but in a dierent group. In this
case, the secret key used to for session group i is mixed with the constant
Q
m2gi(ki;ai;id) f(SIDmkTmkr1).
The worst case is that the adversary and the participants in session group i
were in the same session before, such as session gb. In this case, the adversary72
could derive the value of
Q
m2gb(kb;ab;id) f(SIDmkTmkr1) and therefore, to get the
value of
Q
m2gb(kb;ab;id)m6=j f(SIDmkTmkr1). However, in session i, the adversary
needs to get the value of
Q
m2gb(kb;ab;id)m6=j f(SIDmk(Tm+1)kr1). Since the f is
a one way function and SID is secure according to our theorem, the adversary
cannot derive the secret key of ki. Therefore, the condentiality is ensured.
2. The adversary is not authorized. In this case, an adversary has no advantage
over the previous case, therefore, it cannot derive the secret key.

Next we prove that the integrity of the document is ensured.
4.5.2 Integrity
We need to prove that no subject can modify the content issued by another au-
thorized subject.
Theorem 4.5.3 The protocol ensures data integrity.
Proof This is ensured by authentication polynomials Pai. Each authorized partic-
ipant could derive from the authentication polynomial the public key of the party
which authored this version of the document. Based on the public key signature
scheme, the party will sign the message digest of the content with its private key.
No other party could derive this private key, and more over, the data is dierent for
dierent versions of the document (because at least the Q value will be dierent for
dierent versions of the document), therefore, the signature on the message digest
cannot be forged or replayed. The data integrity is thus ensured. 
4.5.3 Privacy
We need to prove that the protocol ensures access privilege privacy and participant
privacy. We rst prove the participant privacy.73
Theorem 4.5.4 The protocol ensures participant privacy.
Proof According to our denition, participant privacy means that a participant
cannot know who participates in the collaboration except its next receivers, previous
senders, and authorizers of its session group document versions. 
Theorem 4.5.5 The protocol ensures access privilege privacy.
Proof We need to prove that a party cannot learn the privileges of participants in
its group, except who authors the document. Moreover, a party cannot learn the
privileges of participants that are not within its session groups;
Since our protocol ensures participant privacy, a receiver cannot learn who par-
ticipated in its session group or other sessions, not to mention their privileges. When
a party sends the document to the next receiver, the chance that it will know what
kinds of privileges of the receive has does not increase than it does not know who
is the next receiver. That is, the probability that the sender guesses whether the
receiver has read or write access to the document is still the same. 
4.5.4 Participant completeness
Even though a participant does not know who the participants are, except its
senders, next receivers, and authors of its session groups, it can verify that the all the
previous participants have accessed the document.
Theorem 4.5.6 The protocol ensures participant completeness.
Proof If there is any participant left out, then the receiver can detect it by checking
the participant completeness polynomial. Since in this polynomial, Qi is based on
the participants' SIDs and the current value of Qi, it is impossible for any one to
forge a Qi, since according to our theorem, SID is secure and Qi is aggregated. 74
5 TIMELY DISSEMINATION OF CONFIDENTIAL EVENTS IN
CONTENT-BASED PUBLISH/SUBSCRIBE SYSTEMS
In this chapter, we investigate condentiality and availability problems in the applica-
tion of content-based publish/subscribe (pub/sub) systems. We propose an ecient
approach which increases event availability and ensures event condentiality in large
scale pub/sub systems. Instead of keeping the subscription information of the whole
network, a broker only needs to keep the subscription information of its group, which
is a small number of brokers. Therefore, not only are storage requirements reduced for
each broker, but also time and network trac are reduced for subscription informa-
tion propagation. We propose a hierarchical event forwarding scheme. This scheme
increases system availability by tolerating some broker failures. Additionally, our ap-
proach can eciently determine the subscription groups to which an event has to be
delivered by exploiting locality. Moreover, we propose an ecient encryption scheme,
under which a broker encrypts an event only once. The encryption key can be e-
ciently derived by subscribers, even though they may belong to dierent subscription
groups.
5.1 Introduction
Publish/Subscribe (pub/sub) systems provide a new distributed paradigm for event
(message) distribution. In these systems, a publisher publishes an event through a
broker, also called an event dispatcher. Subscribers specify their interests by register-
ing with a broker. Brokers form a network in which they forward events to each other
and, when needed, deliver events to subscribers which have registered with them.
Basically, there are two types of pub/sub systems. The rst, referred to as subject-
based or type-based pub/sub, is a system in which events are labeled with predened75
subjects to which subscribers may subscribe. The second type, referred to as content-
based pub/sub system, is more exible and powerful than the subject-based one. In
such a system, both subscriptions and content are specied with respect to a set of
attributes. An attribute is an ordered pair of name and type. A subscriber subscribes
to events by specifying predicates against attributes. For example, if a schema for a
stock trade is (company: string, price: integer, shares: integer), a subscription could
be: (price < 20) ^ company = \IBM". Because there are no explicit destination
addresses associated with an event, brokers are responsible for delivering each event
to subscribers whose subscriptions are satised by the event, which is called event
matching. Decoupling publishers from subscribers makes the system scalable and
powerful.
In this chapter, we focus on the issue in which condentiality of events needs to be
guaranteed and at the same time, events should be delivered on time, because their
value decreases with time. Stock trading is one application where such issues are of
paramount importance.
Meeting these two requirements can be contradictory, especially in large scale
content-based pub/sub systems where the volume of published events is huge. To
ensure condentiality, an event should be encrypted during transmittal, so that only
authorized subscribers are able to decrypt it. Usually, a group key shared by both
the group members and the brokers is used to encrypt the event. However, since
there could be many attributes and thus a large number of complex predicates, for
n subscribers, there are possibly 2n subscription groups that may be interested in an
event. Therefore, encrypting the event with group keys could result in a signicant
performance cost and make the timely dissemination of events dicult.
A simple approach such as multicasting an event by the broker from which the
event is published requires replicating subscription information at each broker. How-
ever, broker space requirements are a challenge for such approach.
Another consideration for these timely condential event distribution applications
is fault tolerance. A broker failure should not prevent subscribers from receiving76
events on time. System architecture proposed in [57,58] where an event is distributed
along a spanning tree structure, may involve very expensive recongurations [59] if
there is a broker failure.
Moreover, the system should minimize registration information propagating time
(RIP time), which is the time delay for new subscription information to be propagated
into the network. For example, broadcasting an event to each broker, who then
distributes the event to authorized subscribers registered from it, has minimal RIP
time. Any newly accepted subscribers will get matched events. However, if the broker
from which an event is published multicasts directly to authorized subscribers, then it
takes time for new subscription to be propagated to each broker, especially when the
network is large. Therefore, some newly accepted subscribers may miss some events.
Our contribution We propose an event forwarding scheme called hierarchical
event routing. This scheme increases system availability by tolerating some broker
failures. Additionally, our approach can eciently determine the subscription groups
to which an event has to be delivered by exploiting locality. We also propose an
ecient encryption scheme, under which a broker encrypts an event only once. The
encryption key can be eciently derived by subscribers, even though they may belong
to dierent subscription groups. In our solution, a broker needs only to keep the
subscription information of its group, which is a small number of brokers. Therefore,
not only are storage requirements reduced for each broker, but also time and network
trac are reduced for subscription information propagation. We provide theoretical
proofs that our approach ensures event condentiality. Experiment results validate
the high event throughput of our approach.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We describe our application model
in Section 5.2, and then present our hierarchy event routing scheme in Section 5.3
and our event distribution scheme in Section 5.4. Experimental results and related
work are presented in Sections 5.5 and 5.6, respectively. Section 5.7 concludes the
chapter and outlines future work.77
5.2 Model
In this chapter, we focus on how to ensure that condential events are delivered
on time to authorized subscribers. It is important to note that pub/sub systems
involve several security and service quality issues. Here we only address part of them.
Other issues, such as event access control policies, integrity and authentication, are
not the focus of this chapter. Therefore, we assume that brokers are trusted. They
will enforce event access control policies when subscribers subscribe from them; and
they only accept events published by authorized publishers, and guarantee integrity
of events they route.
In our system, a broker may fail, or come under DoS attacks, therefore it may
not be available to deliver events. An unauthorized subscriber of an event (whose
subscription is denied by brokers, or if accepted, the event does not match this sub-
scriber's subscription) may want to access the event.
Note that even though our approach eliminates the matching performed by brokers
while an event is forwarded among them, a matching algorithm is needed when a
broker has to decide to which groups of subscribers an event should be delivered.
However, such a matching algorithm is likewise not the focus of this chapter. We
assume that such an algorithm exists and that locality is used in the algorithm for
eciency.
In the next two sections, we describe our schemes for event distribution. It includes
two steps: the rst one is that an event is routed from the broker from which the
event is published to some brokers, and the second one is the event is forwarded from
these brokers to authorized subscribers.
5.3 Hierarchial event routing scheme
In this section, we describe our event routing scheme among brokers, followed by
a discussion of the main features of this scheme.78
5.3.1 Hierarchy event routing
In our pub/sub system, all brokers are labeled with an ID, such labeling can be
performed by the party responsible for accounting the services of the system.
Denition 5.3.1 A leaf broker group (LBG) with label i is denoted as LBGi where
LBGi = fbi1;bi2;:::;bimg such that
 brokers bi1;:::;bim 2 LBGi are located closely in network topology;
 the ID of each broker in LBG has the same prex as its group ID;
 the size of LBGi is jLBGij and jLBGij  t where t is equal to d 1
1 re and r is
the estimated broker failure rate; and
 if a subscription request is submitted to and then approved by broker bij 2 LBGi,
this subscription will be securely multicasted by bij to all other brokers in LBGi.
Therefore, any broker in a LBG maintains the subscription information of subscribers
who are registered with any broker in the LBG.
Based on the labels of LBGs, a tree is formed where LBGs are the leaves and all
inner nodes are formed by virtual broker group (V BG). Specically, a V BGi has
label i and is virtually formed by either all LBGi or all V BGi.
VBG3
LBG31 LBG32 LBG33 LBG13 LBG12 LBG11
VBG
LBG2 VBG1
Figure 5.1. A 3-ary tree formed by broker groups79
Example 11 Figure 5.1 shows an example of 3-ary tree with a height of 2. The
leaves are LBGs. LBG11 includes brokers b111;b112;b113 and b1113. All these brokers
share the same group label prex (11). Figure 5.2 illustrates the locality of brokers in
Figure 5.1.
Brokers in an LBG periodically authenticate each other and exchange their sub-
scription information; however, a broker does not propagate its subscription informa-
tion to another LBG.
LBG11
LBG31
LBG32
LBG33
LBG12
LBG13
b113
b111
b1113
b112
b232 b221
b212
b231 b211
LBG2
Figure 5.2. The locality of brokers
An additional information kept by each broker is a forwarding table. If a broker
belongs to an LBG at depth h0 of the tree, then the table is of dimension h0(n 1).
Each entry of such a table stores IP addresses of t brokers of other LBGs. Thus, if
r = 10%, each entry keeps information about 2 brokers. In such a table, each column
has n  1 entries. For each of these entries, the label of the stored brokers shares the
same prex as the entry label. These brokers are randomly chosen from their group.
Table 5.1 shows broker 111's table and Table 5.2 shows broker 213's table.
A broker periodically authenticates those brokers kept in its forwarding table and
updates the information in case some brokers are under DoS attack or system failure.80
Table 5.1
Event forwarding table of broker 111
2*(211, 221) 12* (122, 121)
3*(311, 322) 13* (133, 135)
Table 5.2
Event forwarding table of broker 213
1**(114, 132)
3**(312, 321)
Algorithm: Hierarchial Event Routing Scheme
Input: S, H, T
//S: ID of event sender, H: ID of host, T host's routing table of dimension h0(n 1)
1. if(S = H)
for(i = 1 to h0)
for (j = 1 to n   1)
choose a broker in entry (i;j) and forwards the event;
endfor
endfor
2.else let p = max number of matched prex of S and H
for(i = p + 1 to h0)
for(j = 1 to n   1)
choose a broker in entry (i;j) and forwards the event;
endfor
endfor
end
Figure 5.3. Hierarchy event forwarding algorithm
Algorithm 5.3 shows how a broker routes an event. Line 1-5 is the case where
the broker is the one where the event is published. In this case, it routes the event
to one broker in each of its entry in the routing table. Line 8-13 is the case where
the broker receives the event from another broker. In this case, the broker uses the
max common ID prex with the sender to determine to which level it should start81
forwarding an event (Line 8), and then starts to forward the event to all entries from
that level.
5.3.2 Discussion
We now discuss our routing scheme with respect to several metrics.
Broker Space Requirements: In most previous approaches, a broker must keep
subscription information about the whole network. In large scale pub/sub systems,
such a requirement implies that all subscription information is replicated at each
broker. Under our approach, a broker only needs to maintain 1=nh of the whole
network's subscription information, where n and h are the degree and height of the
tree, respectively. In a 4-ary tree with a height of 3, this is only 1=64 of the total
network's subscribe information.
Subscription Information Update: In most previous approaches, new sub-
scription may need to be propagated to the whole network. Our approach needs only
to multicast such information to 1=nh of the network, which greatly reduces network
trac.
Subscription Information Propagation Delay Time: Our approach de-
creases the delay time by propagating this information only within 1=nh of the net-
work.
Execution of Sequential Matching: Our approach requires only a single broker
in a group to perform event matching, thus avoiding the execution of sequential
matching which must be performed by brokers in most tree-based approaches.
Failure Tolerance: Our approach achieves the same level of fault tolerance as
approaches based on event ooding; however, event delivery is faster in our approach
since it takes O(h) for an event to reach a leaf broker. By contrast, under the ooding
approach it takes O(nh) for an event to reach a leaf broker.
Load Balancing: Most tree-based event delivery systems suer from unbalanced
loads. Leaf brokers in the tree seldom perform event matching and forwarding to other82
brokers, while brokers which are centroids1 of the tree suer from a heavy load. In
our approach, the load is almost uniformly distributed among brokers, if a publisher
publishes an event randomly at any broker. Our broker routing table ensures this
property.
Matching Cost: Instead of letting one broker perform matching and event deliv-
ery to all subscribers in the system, in our approach, event matching and distribution
are executed in parallel by nh brokers, each supporting 1=nh of the load. Also, our
scheme possesses locality characteristics and therefore could use caching or popular
group matching algorithms for ecient matching.
Dynamic: When a LBG i has been added too many brokers, such a group could
be handled as a VBG which is formed by several LBGs and all brokers in previous
i are divided into these LBGs. Or when a LBG contains too few brokers as some
brokers have been deleted, such a group could be merged with another LBG.
After a broker nishes routing an event, it needs to distribute the event to autho-
rized subscribers, if any exist. Next, we describe how a broker encrypts an event and
distributes it to all the groups of authorized subscribers within its broker group.
5.4 Condentiality-preserving event delivery
We assume that brokers accept subscription requests by following the policy of
the system, such as requiring payment evidence. After a subscriber submits its sub-
scription, if the request is permitted, the subscriber receives one or more keys corre-
sponding to the groups in which its subscription falls. Since our focus is not on event
space partitioning algorithms, we denote the event space as follows.
Let G = fG1;:::;Gng represent all event space of the subscription information in
a broker group B.
Group Gi is dened as (Si;Ki;Vi) where Si is part of the subscription space, Ki
is the secret key shared by all brokers in B and these subscribers whose subscription
1A centroid of an n-node tree T is a node such that its removal from T leaves no connected compo-
nents of size greater that n=2.83
predicates p are satised by Si, and Vi is a linked list of subscribers which belong
to group Gi. Furthermore, Ki is in f0;1gl where l is a security parameter. For any
Gi;Gj 2 G, Si 6= Sj. However, we do not require that Si \ Sj = ;
Note that because brokers in a group share subscription information, they will
assign subscribers the same group and the corresponding key. In another word, all
brokers in a group keep the same Gi.
Given an event e, a broker must rst run a matching algorithm match (e, G) which
returns G  G, that is, a set of groups to which the event should be delivered. Next,
the broker encrypts the event so that it can be decrypted only by the subscribers in
these groups belong to G.
Because an event may match several groups, encrypting the event several times
with dierent group keys makes event delivery very inecient. Here we propose an
ecient and practical encryption scheme, which has the property that the encryption
key is independent from the group keys. However, all authorized subscribers can
derive the encryption key. Our strategy is the following:
Assume G= fG1;:::;Gmg are the groups to which the event should be delivered.
To encrypt an event, the broker
1. generates a random symmetric encryption key T such that T is in f0;1gl and a
nonce r where r 2 f0;1gl;
2. encrypts the event with T;
3. calculates A = ([G1;D1];:::;[Gm;Dm]) such that Di = h(Ki  r)  T (for
i = 1; ;m), where  is XOR operation and h is a secure one-way function
h : f0;1gl ! f0;1gl.
Then the broker multicasts the encrypted event to all subscribers in G. In the
encrypted event, the broker appends A and the nonce r. A member of group Gi
can obtain T by Di  h(Ki  r) and thus decrypt the event.84
5.4.1 Discussion
In this subsection, we discuss several important correctness properties of our ap-
proach. We rst provide our correctness criteria and then prove that our encryption
scheme satises them.
Denition 5.4.1 Completeness Each authorized subscriber should be able to derive
the key to decrypt an event.
Denition 5.4.2 Soundness If an individual is not authorized to access the event,
then it is not able to decrypt the event. Further, a member subj of some group Gi 2 G,
knowing T, r and A, is not able to derive any secret key Kj of group Gj 2 G (j 6= i),
unless subj belongs to group Gj.
Denition 5.4.3 Collusion-resilience It is impossible for any set of adversaries
to derive a secret key that none of them possesses.
Theorem 5.4.1 The proposed scheme is complete.
Proof For an event, an authorized subscriber belongs to at least one of Gi 2 G to
which the event falls; thus, it has at least one key Ki. As a result, the subscriber can
decrypt T as Di  h(Ki  r) from the public Di and r, and the event too. 
Theorem 5.4.2 The proposed scheme is sound.
Proof To decrypt an event, an individual must obtain the encryption key T. Since
T is mixed in Dis, in order to obtain T, the individual must get at least one h(Kir).
If the individual is an outsider or a system subscriber but does not belong to any of
Gi 2 G, the individual cannot compute any of h(Ki  r)s. Thus, the individual
cannot obtain T.
Consider a subscriber belonging to Gi 2 G. Given the nonce r, A and T, the
subscriber can obtain T by computing Hi = h(Ki  r) and then Di  Hi. Once
knowing T, the subscriber can compute Hj = DjT (for any j = 1;i 1;:::;i+1;m).85
However, due to the one-way property of h function, the subscriber cannot get Kj
from Hj(i:e:;h(Kj  r)). Thus, the proposed scheme is sound. 
Theorem 5.4.3 The proposed scheme is collusion-resilient.
Proof We consider the collusion of subscribers not outsiders since involvement of
outsiders cannot contribute any bit of information useful to reconstruct the keys.
There are three possible collusion: by the subscribers not belonging to any Gi 2 G;
by the subscribers belonging to some Gi 2 G; and by subscribers across several Gi's
in G. For the rst case, these subscribers are equivalent to outsiders, and cannot get
T or any Ki. For the second case, these subscribers can get their T and any of other
Hj = h(Kj  r)s. Because the security of the one-way function is independent of the
number of users trying to break it, the collusion of these subscribers is no stronger
than an individual subscriber trying to get Kj from Hj. The same principle applies
to collusion of multiple subscribers from dierent groups.
As a result, the proposed scheme is resilient to any kinds of collusion attacks. 
5.4.2 Dynamics and rekeying
In a dynamic pub/sub system, the user can subscribe to or unsubscribe/be revoked
from the system, even move from one group to the other. In order to guarantee that
all (and only) current subscribers in a group Gi can obtain the events destined to
the group, the group key Ki needs to be updated. The updated key needs to be
distributed to the users securely. We propose using the same scheme a second time
to address such a requirement. During user registration, the system will assign each
user a unique personal secret ID (denoted as UIDi for user Ui). As a result, if a
new Ki needs to be securely distributed to the current users fU1;U2; ;Ung of a
group Gi, the following message will be multicast (note: r is a new random nonce):
fr;h(UID1  r)  Ki;h(UID2  r)  Ki; ;h(UIDn  r)  Kig.
As for the performance, the proposed scheme is very ecient. The computation
of h depends totally on the algorithm selected and is independent of m, so its compu-86
tation complexity can be considered as constant, such as O(c) where c is a constant.
The XOR operation is fast and can be considered to run in O(1) time. Thus, time
complexity of computing A is O(mc) (i.e., O(m)).
As it can be seen from the discussion, the proposed scheme is secure, ecient, and
dynamic and is able to enforce content condentiality for pub/sub systems.
5.5 Simulation results
The simulations were conducted using a 5-ary tree of 3 levels, i.e., there are total
125 broker groups, with each group having 5 brokers. The total number of brokers in
the system is 625.
Each broker has 50 subscribers. For simplicity, the event space is partitioned into
units. Each subscriber subscribes to 1 unit from the event space.
We experimented with dierent distributions for event popularity and compared
ours with a basic tree-based approach and a multicast-based approach:
 Uniform: Subscribers from any broker subscribe to event space units randomly.
 Normal distribution: Subscribers from a broker i subscribe to event units fol-
lowing a normal distribution. For an event space of n units, the subscription
from broker i has a mean at the unit n  (i + 0:5)=625. We evaluate the eect
of dierent standard deviations: 1=6 of the event space, 5 and 50. This follows
from the fact that a subscription has locality characteristics: subscribers within
a broker have similar distributions of interests, whereas the greater the distance
between brokers, the more dierent the subscription distributions.
We present our results on space requirements for a broker, and on the delay in
receiving an event by subscribers.87
5.5.1 Space Requirements
We measure the space requirement for storing subscription information by a bro-
ker. IP addresses are 4 bytes long and event space is 2 bytes. For each event unit,
if there is at least one subscription, then it forms a subscription group. For each
group, a linked list is used to store subscribers information. Figure 5.4 shows the
result of subscriptions which are uniformly distributed. It reveals that a multicast
approach requires a dramatically large space. When comparing our approach with
the tree-based approach in detail, our approach uses a relatively larger space than a
tree-based approach (see Fig. 5.5). We think this is an acceptable space requirement
(less than 1.4 KB). The results for normal distributions are reported in Fig. 5.6, 5.7,
5.8, 5.9, 5.10, 5.11. They follow similar patterns.
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Next, we check the number of subscription groups formed under dierent sub-
scription distributions. These results are reported in Figure 5.12, 5.13, 5.14, 5.15,
5.16, 5.17. In multicast approach, the number of groups is the same as the number of
event space units. When the standard deviation decreases, our approach has a similar
number of groups as the tree-based approach. For a tree-based approach, the routing88
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information is aggregated, therefore, a broker only needs to maintain the subscription
information from its subscribers. Even for normal distribution with large deviation,
we found that a broker can aggregate these brokers' subscription information into a
very small space.89
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5.5.2 Time Delay
We evaluate the time delay for a subscriber to receive an event. In the evaluation,
it takes 1 unit of time to forward an event to a group. Figure 5.18 reports the time to
deliver an event in a uniform distribution. The tree based approach takes more time90
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due to the series of event forwarding by brokers in such a structure. By contrast,
multicasting needs to forward to all subscription groups of the whole network. Our
hierarchy approach, however, uses parallel event forwarding, which is very ecient.
Figure 5.18 also shows that when the number of subscription groups increases, the
performance of a multicast approach degrades; it is slower than the tree-based ap-91
proach when the event space size reaches 350. Figures 5.19, 5.20, 5.21 report the
results for normal distributions. The tree-based approach is relatively stable regard-
less of the standard deviation. When the standard deviation increases, our approach
takes a longer time.
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Figure 5.18. Time delay (uniform)
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Figure 5.19. Time de-
lay ( = 1=6 of event
space)
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Figure 5.20. Time delay ( =5)
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Figure 5.21. Time delay ( =50)92
5.5.3 Broker Involvement
The number of brokers involved in forwarding an event reects the load that a
broker takes. Figure 5.22 shows the number of brokers that are involved in delivery
of an event. The subscription rate of events is uniformly distributed. The horizontal
axis shows the subscription rate of each broker. The vertical axis shows the number
of brokers involved in delivering an event. For the tree-based approach, a spanning
tree is built by applying Dijkstra's algorithm on a graph of 625 nodes, each node with
degree d where d is uniformly distributed from 1 to 4. The result is the average of
ten runs, where at each run, an event is published at a randomly chosen broker. We
also present the ideal approach, where only the brokers subscribing to an event are
those which participate in the delivery of the event. From Fig. 5.22, the tree-based
approach needs more brokers to participate in the event delivery, especially when
subscription rate is 20%, half of the brokers involved are not interested in an event.
As the subscription rate increases, the tree-based approach reaches the same number
as the ideal approach at 100%. In that instance, all brokers in a tree-based approach
are interested in the event.
Hierarchical event forwarding uses an almost constant number of brokers for for-
warding an event. If there is no broker failure, this number is equal to the number of
broker groups and it is not related to the subscription rate. Therefore, when the sub-
scription rate is below 20%, our approach needs more brokers than the ideal approach.
Our approach uses less brokers than the tree-based approach when the subscription
rate is above 6%. For a broker with 50 subscriptions, this means an event has popu-
larity below 0.12%. Thus, our approach seldom uses more brokers than the tree-based
approach.
5.6 Related work
Several studies have been devoted to investigating eciency issues concerning
pub/sub systems [1,3,58{61,61{70] and several prototype systems have been devel-93
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Figure 5.22. The number of brokers involved
oped. Most approaches like [58,59,66] use a spanning tree structure for event routing.
In order to reduce the matching that has to be performed by brokers from the root to
the leaves, several optimization techniques have been proposed. Virtual groups are
used to reduce the matching performed by brokers [57].
However, security issues [65] in content-based pub/sub systems have not been so
widely investigated. Srivatsa and Liu [1] propose a resilient network which, instead
of providing only a single path from each publisher to its subscribers which is inher-
ited from the spanning tree structure, several independent paths from a publisher to
each of its subscribers are provided. Such paths are built deterministically. In their
approach, building several independent paths from a publisher to every subscriber in-
volves complex topology computations. In dynamic environments, such computation
is expensive. Such expensive recongurations of tree structures have been completely
eliminated in our hierarchy event forwarding scheme. Each broker maintains a for-
warding table which ensures that at least one broker in the next forwarding level is
operative.
To avoid unnecessary event broadcasting, Carzaniga et al. [58] proposes an ap-
proach that broadcasts events only along the spanning tree. As previously mentioned,
in dynamic environments, a tree structure is hard to maintain and may become dis-94
connected. Broadcasting along a disconnected tree involves more redundancy and
does not solve the availability problem.
Opyrchal and Prakash [71] discuss how a broker can encrypt an event and de-
liver it to a possibly very large number of groups. As each group has a secret key
shared by members and brokers, encrypting the event using a group key may involve
performing many encryption operations, and there may be several groups to which
this event should be delivered. Caching and clustering are therefore used to make
fewer encryptions. In our condentiality-preserving encryption scheme, an event is
encrypted only once. All authorized subscribers can derive the key for decryption the
event eciently. Our scheme is provably secure.
5.7 Conclusions and future work
In this chapter, we address some security issues of content-based pub/sub sys-
tems. We focus on increasing the availability of events and ensuring condentiality
when events are delivered to authorized subscribers. Our schemes (hierarchical event
forwarding and condentiality-preserving encryption) are ecient and scalable. Our
approach is especially suitable for large-scale content-based pub/sub systems. Simu-
lation results validate the eciency of our approach.
We plan to investigate other security issues in content-based pub/sub systems,
especially how brokers can eciently authenticate each other, and how to ensure
condentiality of events forwarded among brokers. We would like to investigate an
ecient mechanism for matching an encrypted event against subscriptions, which is
suitable for large-scale content-based pub/sub systems.LIST OF REFERENCES95
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